Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents--The Not-Quite-Holy Grail by Oddi, A. Samuel
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 2 Article 8
6-1-1999
Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents--The
Not-Quite-Holy Grail
A. Samuel Oddi
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
A. S. Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents--The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 267 (2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol71/iss2/8
Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-
The Not-Quite-Holy Grail
A. Samuel Oddi*
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 268
II. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION ................................. 271
A. Protectability .............................................. 272
B. Conditions for Protection ................................... 272
C. Scope of Protection ......................................... 272
D. Predictability of Outcomes .................................. 273
III. THE THEORIES ............................................... 273
A. Classical Theories ......................................... 273
1. Reward Theory ...................................... 275
2. Patent-Induced Theory .............................. 277
B. Post-Classical Theories ..................................... 281
1. Prospect Theory ..................................... 281
2. Race-to-Invent Theory ............................... 282
3. Rent Dissipation Theory ............................. 284
C. Generalizations and Comparisons ........................... 286
1. Protectability ........................................ 287
2. Conditions for Protection ............................ 287
3. Scope for Protection ................................. 288
4. Summary of Predictions ............................. 289
IV. APPLICATION OF THEORIES .................................... 289
A. Protectability .............................................. 290
1. Statutory Subject Matter ............... ? ............. 290
2. U tility ............................................... 306
B. Conditions for Protection ................................... 307
1. N ovelty .............................................. 307
2. Nonobviousness ..................................... 313
C. Scope of Protection ......................................... 317
1. Literal Infringement ................................. 318
2. Doctrine of Equivalent .............................. 320
3. Contributory Infringement .......................... 321
D. A Word on "Signals" ..................................... 323
V. CONCLUSION ................................................. 326
* Professor, Northern Illinois University, College of Law. The author wishes to
acknowledge the valuable research assistance provided by James Richard Myers at Northern
Illinois University in the preparation of this article and that provided by Kenneth E. Murray
during the final stage, while the author was Visiting Professor, University of California, Davis,
School of Law. The author also wishes to thank Professors Leslie Kurtz and Leo Raskind for their
thoughtful comments on the manuscript.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In a very rough sort of way, the search for a unifying economic theory
of patents may be seen as paralleling the search for a unifying scientific
theory of the universe. As put by physicist Steven Hawking in his best sell-
ing book, A Brief History of Time. "The eventual goal of science is to provide
a single theory that describes the whole universe."' Nobel laureate, Leon
Lederman, in his recent book, The God Paticle, declares: "Unification, the
search for a simple and all-encompassing theory, is the Holy Grail."2 At
present scientists must describe the universe in terms of two very basic par-
tial theories-general relativity and quantum mechanics; unfortunately,
these partial theories are known to be inconsistent with one another.3 The
general theory of relativity may be seen as describing the universe at the
"macro" level, involving the force of gravity with respect to relatively large
structures and distances. 4 Quantum mechanics theory may be seen as
describing the universe at the "micro" level of extremely small structures
and distances.5
Analogously, various theories have been developed in an attempt to
describe the patent system. 6 These theories have usually been at the macro
level to describe the overall patent system as providing a net economic ben-
efit or loss to society. More recently, theories have been advanced for
1 STEVENW. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 10 (1988). While the book was a best seller,
it probably was not one of the best read books. "Something like 5.5 million copies sold made
Hawking's A Brief History of Time a runaway best seller that very few buyers actually read. And no
wonder. It was all but impenetrable to anyone but a physicist." Clarence Petersen, Tribune Books,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1992, at C2; see also LEON M. LEDERMAN & DICK TERESi, THE GOD PARTICLE
(1993); STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY (1993).
2 LEDERMAN & TERESI, supra note 1, at 348. A decade earlier John Gribbin reflected the
same metaphor: "[T]he Holy Grail of physicists today is a true unification of [general relativity
and quantum mechanics] into one grand theory." JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHRODINGER'S
CAT: QUANTUM PHYSIcs AND REALITY 175 (1984).
3 HAWKING, supra note 1, at 11-12.
4 Id. at 11.
5 Id.
6 The theories may be morally orjustice based or, more recently, economically based. The
description has generally been in support of or in opposition to the patent system. The various
classical theories of patents are described and critiqued in EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM (1951); STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM,
STUDY No. 15 (COMM. PRINT 1958) (F. Machlup, auth.) [hereinafter Machlup]. Steven Cheung
summarizes the views of influential economic analysts:
One view-advanced by Bentham (1795) and shared by Say (1803), Mill (1848), and
Clark (1907)-holds that patent rights are absolutely necessary to encourage inventions.
A second view, advanced by Taussig (1915) and shared by Pigou (1920), maintains that
a system of patent rights is largely superfluous. Third, Plant (1934), with modem follow-
ers, argued that a patent system is actually detrimental. Finally, Arrow (1962), . . . ar-
gued that although property rights in ideas are clearly useful, they are nonetheless
inferior to direct government investment in inventive activities.
Steven N.S. Cheung, Prperty Rights and Invention, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5, 5-6
(ohn Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986). See generallyJOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAw
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES ch. 2 (1993); K.W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994). Other literature relating to the economics of the patent
system will be cited infra at appropriate points.
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describing the patent system at a micro level in terms of explaining the
outcome of actual patent validity decisions. 7
The physics analogy may be carried further into classical and modem
periods. The classical period in physics (in particular, Newtonian mechan-
ics) ended with quantum mechanics.8 The classical theories of the patent
system would include natural law/justice based theories (principally the
"reward" theory)9 and pragmatic or economics based theories (principally
the "patent-induced" theory).1° The modem era in patent economic the-
ory may be seen as beginning in 1977 with Kitch's publication of an article
describing the "prospect" theory of the patent system-analogizing from
the U.S. mineral claims system." This theory has been highly controversial
and criticized by various commentators, including those supporting classi-
cal theories.' 2 In 1990, Merges and Nelson presented a new theory of the
patent system, designated the "race-to-invent" theory, based upon empirical
studies that society would benefit from granting patents with a relatively
narrow scope of protection so as to permit competition in improvement
inventions (innovations) to enhance the rapidity of development. 13 The
most recent theory advanced by Grady and Alexander is a micro theory
(i.e., predictive of individual patent cases) based upon "rent dissipation"
theory.' 4 The essence of this theory is that patents should minimize rent
7 Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305
(1992); Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal CircuWs Patent Nonobvious Standards: Theoretical Per-
spectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1051 (1991).
8 See LEDERMAN & TERESI, supra note 1, at 102-03, 154-75.
9 See PENROSE, supra note 6, at 21-31; Machlup, supra note 6, at 21-24. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 46-48. The reward theory also has an economic basis. See WARD S. BowMAN JR.,
PATENT ANTrrRUST LAw: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 30-32, 3840 (1971) (citing FRANK H.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1957); An Answer to, Is Group Choice a Part of Economics,
67 Q.J. ECON. 608 (1953)); infra text accompanying notes 49-60.
10 See FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ch. 16 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter SCHERER, INDUSTIAL]; Alfred E. Kahn, The Role of Patents, in
Competition, Cartels and Their Regulation 308 (John P. Miller ed., 1962); Douglas F. Greer, The Case
Against Patent Systems in Less-Developed Countries, 8J. INT'L L. & ECON. 223 (1973); A. Samuel Oddi,
Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 Am. U. L. REv. 1097, 1101-02,
1114-16 (1989) [hereinafter Oddi, Beyond Obviousness]; A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copy-
right than forPatent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REv. 351 (1993) [hereinafter Oddi,
Uneasier Case]; A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality
or Myth? 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 [hereinafter Oddi, International Patent System].
11 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977)
[hereinafter Kitch, Nature and Function].
12 See Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, in 5
RESEARCH IN LAw AND ECONOMICS 193 (Richard 0. Zerbe,Jr. ed., 1983); Grady & Alexander, supra
note 7, at 313-16; Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Sur-
plus: A Comment, 23J.L. & ECON. 197 (1980); Oddi, Beyond Obviousness, supra note 10, at 1110-12;
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 10, at 476-77 & n. 3 (citing RobertJ. Gordon, The Incidence of the
Corporation Income Tax, 57 Am. ECON. REv. 751 (1967)).
13 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 839 (1990); see also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. Rxv. 803 (1988).
14 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7; Rhodes, supra note 7. On rent theory generally, see
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (consider-
ing the theory, measurement and applications of rent-seeking). Judge Posner defines "rent-seek-
ing" as "the incentive to overproduce 'goods that promise a return greater than the cost of
production (that is, an economic 'rent'), and to the resulting waste when rents are transformed,
through competition to obtain them, into costs." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 342
(1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 37-38 (4d ed. 1992) (analyzing the costs
of such behavior) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
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dissipation at the invention (conception) and innovation (improvement)
stages.15 Accordingly, the theory may be used to predict the outcome of
individual patent cases, with a particular patent being enforced if overall
rent dissipation is avoided. 16
The analogy between physics and patent economic theory, however,
breaks down at the most fundamental level. Both classical and quantum
mechanics are scientifically verifiable. Newton's laws still work quite nicely,
provided one does not travel too fast, as does Einstein's general theory of
relativity, provided one does not stray into the subatomic universe. 17 Un-
fortunately, neither classical nor modern patent economic theory is verifia-
ble. At the present state of knowledge, macro theories must be based on
assumptions concerning societal outcomes. There is no general agreement
that any of the macro theories of the overall patent system can rigorously
demonstrate that a patent system provides a net societal benefit.' 8 The
extrapolation from macro to micro theory may be especially unrewarding
when applied in the unmeasurable universe of actual patent cases. The
objective difficulty of evaluating factual situations and doctrinal applica-
tions in actual patent cases may be analogized to the "uncertainty princi-
ple" in physics. Broadly stated, the uncertainty principle recognizes that,
because of the physical nature of light and particles, it is impossible to mea-
sure speed and position with exacting certainty; thus quantum mechanics
predicts probability of outcome rather than actual outcome.' 9 One would
hope for similar qualifications in any predictive economic theory of out-
come in actual patent cases. Nonetheless, if any of the economic theories
15 Grady and Alexander indicate a third possible source of rent dissipation due to maintain-
ing the secrecy of inventions rather than relying upon the patent system for protection. Grady &
Alexander, supra note 7, at 308-09. Economists employ the term "innovation" to define the tech-
nological developments that follow from a basic invention and that are actually commercialized:
The terms "invention" and "innovation" suggest the conceptual formulations of Abbott
Payson Usher andJoseph A. Schumpeter. Crucial to Usher's conception of invention is
an "act of insight" going beyond the exercise of normal technical skill, even though
additional activities (perception of a problem, setting the stage, and critical revision) are
also recognized. Schumpeter, on the other hand, defined innovation as "the carrying
out of new combinations." For the case of new technology this can be identified with
reducing an invention to practice and exploiting it commercially.
FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 8 (1984) (footnotes omitted). Patent attorneys,
however, tend to talk in terms of improvement inventions or patents, which improve upon a basic
invention or patent. For the purposes of this Article, the terms innovation and improvement
invention or patent will be used interchangeably, with the understanding that the improvement
invention or patent has been commercialized.
16 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 309.
17 See HAWKING, supra note 1, at 10, 13.
18 Machlup concludes from his study:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible on the basis of our
present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
Machlup, supra note 6, at 80; see also Oddi, International Patent System, supra note 10, at 832 n.2
(collecting studies). Indeed, Grady and Alexander state that "rent dissipation would be a much
smaller problem" if there were no patent system, but that the nature of their theory permits them
"to be agnostic about whether patent rewards are a good idea." Grady & Alexander, supra note 7,
at 309-10; see also id. at 317.
19 HAWKING, supra note 1, at 55-61. Upon learning of the inherent randomness of quantum
mechanics, Albert Einstein expressed his objection: "God does not play dice." Id at 56; see also
LEDERMAN, supra note 1, at 175-88.
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is capable of predicting the outcome of individual cases in terms of effi-
ciency, it would seem to follow that the overall system would also result in a
net benefit. Could this then be the "Holy Grail" of patent economic the-
ory? This Article concludes that none of the theories is consistently predic-
tive of case outcomes, in particular the rent dissipation theory, which is the
only theory that claims predictability in actual cases. Thus, the overall con-
clusion is that currently there is no unifying theory that describes the over-
all patent system and the outcome of individual cases.
To reach this conclusion, a framework for evaluating the various theo-
ries is developed in Part II of the Article, the various classical and modern
theories are briefly discussed and critiqued in Part III A and B, the charac-
teristic outcomes predicted by the various theories are identified in Part III
C, and the theories are applied to various actual cases to test their respec-
tive predictive powers in Part IV.
The conclusion that no unifying theory has yet been presented is not
intended to diminish the quest for theories, economic and otherwise, for
explaining the patent system at both the macro and micro levels; nonethe-
less, any unifying theory of patents is apt to prove even more elusive than
the unifying theory in science.20
II. FRAMEwoRK FOR EVALUATION
To evaluate whether an economic theory predicts the outcome of ac-
tual patent litigation, some framework for that evaluation is necessary. In
the first instance, one would expect the economic theory to be consistent
with the patent statute, its substance and procedure.21 Nonetheless, be-
cause of the broad statutory language establishing basic principles of pat-
ent law, courts have a great deal of flexibility in construing the statute. A
fundamental issue with respect to the grant of a patent is the "pro-
tectability" of the invention. The sine qua non for the patent grant is that
the invention must fall with the statutory classes of invention (viz. "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter") and must be "useful"
(i.e., possess "utility" in the commercial sense) 22 The two basic issues in
patent litigation are: validity (Does the invention as claimed meet the con-
20 See WEINBERG, supra note 1, at 4-6 (discussing importance of the Supercollider and its im-
portance to finding a unifying theory); see also LEDERMAN, supra note 1, at 378-81. Congress termi-
nated the Supercollider project in October, 1993, rendering a severe blow to the advancement of
particle physics. E. Michael Myers, Burial Servicafor Texas Supercollider, UPI, Oct. 26, 1993, avail-
able in WESTLAW, UPI database. Nonetheless, evidence of the elusive "top" quark was reported
by physicists working at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in April, 1994. The top quark,
along with the up, down, charm, stranger and bottom quarks, constitute the basic building blocks
of matter according to the Standard model. J. Madeleine Nash, Gotchal, TIME, May 9, 1994, at 69;
Fermilab Finds Evidence of Elusive Top Quark, NucLEAR NEws, June 1994, at 74; cf. George L. Priest,
What Economists Can Tell Lanuers About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung in 8 RESEARCH IN
LAw AND ECONOMICS 19, 19 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986) ("The ratio of
empirical demonstration to assumption in [patent economic] literature must be very close to
zero.").
21 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
22 35 U.S.C. §101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title."
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ditions (standard) for protection?) 23 and infringement (Does the accessed
subject matter fall within scope of protection of the patent?) .24 An invalid
patent, of course, cannot be infringed. The value of predictability is not
limited solely to the validity issue. A unified comprehensive theory would
also be expected to predict infringement.
A. Protectability
The issue of protectability is more likely to be addressed at the grant
stage rather than in litigation for-a particular invention. Nonetheless,
whether a patent is granted or sustained will depend upon whether a broad
or narrow interpretation is given to statutory subject matter and to the util-
ity requirement. Protectability tends to affect primarily inventions of a fun-
damental nature at an early stage of development.25 Thus, a theory
positing a broad interpretation of statutory subject matter and utility will
predict the protection of such inventions, while a theory positing a narrow
interpretation would tend to exclude them.
B. Conditions for Protection
A determination of the validity of a patent by a court is an ex post
determination that the claimed invention complied ex ante with the condi-
tions for protection. The essential substantive conditions to sustain the pat-
ent are that the invention claimed be novel (according to 35 U.S.C.
§ 102)26 and, moreover, not be obvious to one skilled in the particular field
of that invention (according to 35 U.S.C. § 103).27 A particular theory may
posit a high standard for the grant of a patent, thereby predicting a higher
probability that a particular patent will be held invalid in litigation. Con-
versely, a theory may posit a low standard for protection, thereby predict-
ing a higher probability that a particular patent will be held valid.
C. Scope of Protection
The scope of protection is defined by the claims of the patent as sup-
ported by the patent disclosure, which must enable a person skilled in the
art to practice the claimed invention. 28 Literal infringement defines the
primary scope of protection, i.e., a patent claim may be literally read ele-
23 The conditions for protection are defined in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 & 103 (1988) (quoted infra
notes 256, 286, respectively).
24 The conduct that constitutes infringement is specified in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (quoted infra
notes 239, 313, 316, 336, 337, 340).
25 See Oddi, Beyond Obviousness, supra note 10, at 1117-20; infra text accompanying notes 249-
55 (further discussing the impact of narrow construction of 35 U.S.C. § 101 on basic inventions).
26 35 U.S.C. § 102 (quoted infra note 256).
27 35 U.S.C. § 103 (quoted infra note 286).
28 Section 112 imposes the "enabling" requirement of disclosure:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the man-
ner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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ment-by-element upon an accused subject matter.29 The scope of protec-
tion may be augmented by nonliteral infringement, -particularly by the
doctrines of equivalents3 ° and contributory3 l and induced32 infringement.
A theory that posits a broad scope of infringement (literal and nonliteral)
would predict infringement more probably than a theory positing a narrow
scope of protection.
D. Predictability of Outcomes
Predictability of outcomes in actual patent litigation would thus be a
function of how the theory posits the conditions for protection (low to
high) and the scope of protection (broad to narrow), presuming statutory
subject matter and utility requirements of protectability have been met. A
theory that posits a low standard for protection and a broad scope of pro-
tection will predict more cases of validity and infringement than a theory
that posits a high standard for protection and a narrow scope of protection.
Predictability of outcome may also depend upon whether pro-
tectability, the conditions for protection, and the scope of protection vary
as a function of the type of invention claimed in the patent. Thus, a theory
that posits a narrow definition of statutory subject matter and utility may
bar certain basic inventions from protection. A theory that posits a high
standard for protection and broad scope of protection for basic inventions
(compared to detail inventions) may be expected to predict a higher
probability of validity and infringement of basic compared to detail
inventions.
III. THE THEORIES
In this section, the various patent economic theories will be briefly
described and critiqued and their respective predictive characteristics iden-
tified with respect to the following: a broad or narrow interpretation of
protectability, a high or low standard for protection, a broad or narrow
scope of protection, and variations of the standard or scope according to
the categorization of invention.
A. Classical Theories
The classical theories of the patent system may be subdivided into two
categories: natural law/justice based theories and economic/public policy-
based theories. The natural law/justice based theories may be subdivided
into the "natural property rights" or "natural-law" theory3 3 and the "reward
for services rendered" or "reward by monopoly" theory34 (collectively the
"reward" theory).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 314-29 (discussing literal infringement).
30 See infra text accompanying notes 330-35 (discussing doctrine of equivalents).
31 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (quoted infra note 337).
32 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (quoted infra note 336).
33 See PENROSE, supra note 6, at 19-26; Machlup, supra note 6, at 21-22.
34 See PENROSE, supra note 6, at 26-31; Machlup, supra note 6, at 21, 23.
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The natural property rights theory is based upon the premise that in-
ventors inherently have the property right in their inventions and that, in
justice, society must recognize that right.3 5 In essence, the right to have
one's inventions protected is one of those "rights of man."3 6 This theory
has not received much attention in the modem era, because, perhaps, of
the relative demise of natural lawjurisprudence 37 and thus will not be sepa-
rately addressed in this Article.
The reward theory continues to have vitality in the modem era and
will be addressed in detail below. 38 Briefly, the rationale of this theory is
that an inventor has a natural right to receive a reward for providing an
invention to society, and that reward should be in the form of a monopoly
and commensurate with the usefulness to society of the proffered inven-
tion. This theory is justice based in the sense that society is considered to
be morally obligated under natural law theory to grant the reward;3 9 yet it
is also based on an economic premise that the "just" monopoly reward pro-
vided is (or should be) proportional to the benefit received by society.
The economic or policy based theories may be subdivided into the
"disclosure of secrets" or "exchange for secrets" theory40 and the "encour-
agement of invention" or "monopoly profit incentive" theory.4' The latter
theory will be designated herein as the "patent-induced" theory as more
aptly descriptive of it. The patent-induced theory will be considered in de-
tail below. 42 Briefly, the essence of this theory is that patents should be
offered in order to induce an adequate number of inventions for society
and that, on balance, the benefits derived from inducing inventions exceed
the costs of protecting inventions by the patent monopoly.43
The disclosure of, or exchange for, secrecy theory will not be consid-
ered separately below, for it is the patent system that may provide the in-
ducement for inventors to disclose their inventions to the public rather
35 See PENROSE, supra note 6, at 21; Machlup, supra note 6, at 22.
36 This thesis is expressly adapted in the preamble of the French Patent statute of 1791:
That every novel idea whose realization or developmenit can become useful to society
belong primarily to him who conceived it, and that it would be violation of the rights of
man in their very essence if an industrial invention were not regarded as the property of
its creator.
Quoted in Machlup, supra note 6, at 22.
37 "The natural law tradition is not one that has generated much enthusiasm in the contem-
porary world outside of Roman Catholic circles." GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 78 (1973).
38 See infra text accompanying notes 45-63.
39 See PENROSE, supra note 6, at 26; Machlup, supra note 6, at 23.
40 See PENROSE, supra note 6, at 31-34; Machlup, supra note 6, at 21, 24-25.
41 See PENROSE, supra note 6, at 34-39; Machlup, supra note 6, at 21, 23-24.
42 See infra notes accompanying notes 64-90.
43 See SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 10, at 443 (emphasis added):
[E]xcept when innovators' profits come largely from cannibalization of the profits that
would otherwise be enjoyed by the producers of substitute products, it is likely that soci-
ety as a whole (i.e., including both consumers and producers) gains from inventions
and innovations induced or hastened by the grant of patent rights.
Id.; see also Greer, supra note 10, at 224 ("Nevertheless, it can be formally demonstrated that the
economic benefits of such inventions (in the form of production cost saving or new product
consumption utilities) always exceed those social costs to yield a net social benefit.") (footnotes
omitted); KAHN, supra note 10, at 311 ("So long as the innovation would not have been forthcom-
ing without the patent, this social cost must always be less than the benefit; but of course the
converse is equally true.").
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than relying upon secrecy. However, because secrecy may be a reasonable
alternative to patent disclosure, the potential for secrecy will be considered
in the analysis of the predictability of various theories at appropriate places
in the Article.4
1. Reward Theory
The reward theory, as any other theory based upon natural law, suffers
from the necessity of accepting as a matter of faith that property is a natu-
ral right rather than a creation of society.45 The theory further suffers
from requiring its extension to intangible property in the form of the ex-
clusivity granted by a patent and from the fact that an invention is an inex-
haustible form of property; hence, its value to society should increase with
its use. This brings into play the economic hypothesis upon which the re-
ward theory is based, as stated by Penrose:
The more widely a good can be used, the greater, surely, is its total useful-
ness. To limit its use is to limit its usefulness, although this may, at the
same time, give it an economic value. This is, of course, a restatement of
the famous paradox of value, but so far as inventions are concerned a
price is put on them not because they are scarce but in order to make
them scarce to those who want to use them.46
Reward to the inventor thus depends upon commercial success and the
ability to restrict output by monopoly pricing. In other words, for an inven-
tor to reap a reward, it is necessary that the invention be commercialized.
Because of the finite term of a patent, those inventions that may be ahead
of their time may not be rewarded commensuratively to their contribution
to society, while those inventions that may be easily commercialized may be
excessively rewarded considering the relatively trivial contribution made.47
While it may not be possible to demonstrate rigorously that the reward
theory satisfies principles ofjustice and achieves a net-beneficial economic
outcome, it may still serve as some guide to predicting the outcome of ac-
tual patent litigation. It may, at least, offer a partial theory of the patent
system.
Bowman supports the reward theory on purely economic grounds to
prevent "free riding" by copyists;48 however, he maintains that the reward
system should be consumer oriented and that a relatively high standard of
patentability should be imposed to prevent the routinizer from obtaining
excessive rewards. 49 The rationale for the consumer-oriented system is that
the marketplace is a better determiner of usefulness of inventions than
44 In addition, under rent dissipation theory, rent may be dissipated by reliance upon secrecy
rather than on patents. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 305-08, 342.
45 See PENROSE, supra note 6, at 22.
46 Id.
47 "One man may spend his life developing a great idea for which society is not ready, an-
other may perfect a bright idea in an evening for a clever gadget which society is willing to buy in
large quantities and pay millions of dollars for.' Id. at 30-31.
48 BowMAN, supra note 9, at 32.
49 Id. at 34.
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other means, such as, offering direct subsidies or limiting protection to
high cost inventions.50
Kitch does not question the reward theory "on its own terms" but ar-
gues that it "offers an incomplete view of the functions of the patent sys-
tem."51 He defines the reward theory as: "The conventional view of the
patent system as a device that enables an inventor to capture the returns
from his investment in the invention. . . -52 According to Kitch, the re-
ward theory provides an incomplete view because it assumes a negatively
sloped demand curve, i.e., a monopoly condition for the patent owner.53
The prospect theory, on the other hand, assumes a horizontal demand
curve, i.e. a competitive situation, in the vast majority of cases. 54 The pros-
pect theory will be considered in detail below.55
The reward theory continues to have some vitality in the modern era.
Rhodes employs the reward theory to illustrate that it is being followed by
the Supreme Court in its patentability decisions.56 He isolates two doc-
trines bearing upon the nonobviousness issue, namely, "synergism" and
"commercial success. '57 He concludes, because the reward theory is pri-
marily concerned about the costs of rewarding all inventions, that a high
standard of patentability is suggested, including the synergism require-
ment, and that secondary considerations, such as commercial success,
would not be an important consideration in determining nonobvious-
ness.58 In contrast, Rhodes concludes that Kitch's prospect theory better
explains the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which reject the doctrine of synergism and heavily rely upon commercial
success as indicative of nonobviousness. 59
50 Id. at 38, 47.
51 Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 11, at 266.
52 IM.
53 Id. at 274.
54 Id.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 91-103.
56 Rhodes, supra note 7, at 1053.
57 Id. In Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966), the seminal case interpreting
the nonobviousness standard of "invention" under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Court stated: "Such sec-
ondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have
relevancy." The so-called synergism requirement was later applied by the Supreme Court as a
gloss on the nonobviousness standard of § 103 in two cases involving combination patents -
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969) (the combination of
mounting a radiant heater in a conventional asphalt paving machine) and Sakraida v. Ag Pro,
Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976) (combination of old elements for flushing manure from a barn floor).
In Sakraida, the Court concluded: "We cannot agree that the combination of these old elements
to produce an abrupt release of water directly on the barn floor from storage tanks or pools can
properly be characterized as synergistic," that is, 'result[ing] in an effect greater than the sum of
the several effects taken separately.'" Id. at 282 (quoting Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 61). In
neither case did the commercial success of the inventions convince the Court of their
nonobviousness.
58 Rhodes, supra note 7, at 1080.
59 Id. at 1094-95. In Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), the court considered a synergism request "unnecessary and confusing." In Stratoflex,
Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court indicated there was no separate
category of "combination patents." Id. at 1540. In addition, the court suggested that district
courts must take into account secondary considerations on the issues of nonobviousness. Id. at
1538-39.
[Vol. 71:2
UN-UNIFIED THEORIES OF PATENTS
Grady and Alexander maintain they are "agnostic about whether pat-
ent rewards are a good idea."60 In line with their rent dissipation theory,
the reward theory is not rejected outright but reduced to what they call the
"weak version"-to the effect that patents are intended to reward and thus
stimulate inventive activity.61 Indeed, they find that the reward theory has
considerable predictive power over many types of cases. The significant
shortcoming of the reward theory, in their view, is in explaining why, what
they term, "elegant" inventions (i.e., inventions that are not improvable)
are not protected 62 The rent dissipation theory will be discussed in detail
below. 63
2. Patent-Induced Theory
The patent-induced theory is an economic based theory that posits
generally that if patents were only granted on inventions induced by the
patent system, this would result in a net benefit to society.64 Under this
theory, the monopoly reward of a patent would only be granted to inven-
tors whose inventions were actually induced by the patent system. A causal
relationship is required between the availability of the patent system and
the creation of the invention: But for the patent system the invention
would not have been made available to be public.65 The primary differ-
ence between the patent-induced theory and the reward theory is that the
former would reward only those patents induced by the patent system,
while the latter would reward all inventions regardless of what motivated
the inventor to create them. The patent-induced theory thus would elimi-
nate from protection those inventions, induced by other than the patent
system, such as those induced by the market, scientific curiosity, or acci-
dent.66 Protecting such nonpatent-induced inventions by patents is costly
to society because such inventions would be provided free of the patent
monopoly. The patent-induced theory is thus a much narrower theory
than the reward theory; however, it does incorporate the reward aspect of
the reward theory, but would limit the reward of a patent to inventions
induced by the patent system.6 7
Perhaps the best modem statement of the interrelationship of the re-
ward to stimulate invention and the benefit to society is found in Graham v.
60 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 309-10.
61 Id at 312. They elevate what is called the patent-induced theory here to the "strong ver-
sion" of the reward theory. "The strong version of reward theory, as advanced in the works of
Frederic Scherer and, more recently, A. Samuel Oddi, posits that rewards should explain actual
patent decisions." Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 312-13 (notes omitted). This usage is
questioned, as is the assertion that the patent-induced theory has been advanced to "explain
actual patent decisions."
62 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 326-27.
63 See infra text accompanying notes 114-28.
64 See supra note 43.
65 "Induced" is used in a broad sense to indicate that the patent system may induce inven-
tions at all stages of the creative process, from conception through improvement (commerciali-
zation) and related applications and by providing an alternative to protection by secrecy. See
Oddi, Uneasier Case, supra note 10, at 374-75.
66 See SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 10, at 444-47.
67 In this context, the patent-induced theory would be better characterized as the "narrow
version" of the reward theory rather than the "strong version."
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John Deere Co.,68 the seminal case interpreting the nonobviousness standard
for patentability codified in § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act: "The inherent
problem was to develop some means of weeding out those inventions
which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a pat-
ent."69 Thus, Graham provides a doctrinal basis for the patent-induced the-
ory in addition to its economic one.70 The nonobviousness standard as
articulated in Graham provides one means of separating patent-induced
from nonpatent-induced inventions;71 however, no means are provided for
eliminating the economic costs associating with inventions that can satisfy
the nonobviousness standard but still would have been invented without a
patent system; in particular, market-induced inventions.
A major contribution to the patent-induced theory was made by Frede-
ric W. Scherer, who developed a topology of inventions based on the costs
and benefits of investing in the development of various categories of inven-
tions as predictive of whether the patent system was needed to induce that
investment.72 "Revolutionary inventions" are defined as those that produce
a genuine revolution in consumption or production.7" Basic inventions of
68 883 U.S. 1 (1965).
69 Id. atll.
70 In Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 728 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc),Judge Posner
was unable to convince the full court to vigorously apply the patent-induced rationale of Graham.
The court, rehearing this case en banc, refused to hold Roberts' patent on a "quick release socket
wrench" invalid as a matter of law, asJudge Posner had in his opinion in the original appeal. 697
F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and reh'ggranted 723 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1988). Instead, the full
court remanded for a new trial because the jury had been permitted to be the final arbiter of
obviousness. In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Posner concluded that the stan-
dard for obviousness should be: "[I]f a court thinks an invention for which a patent is being
sought would have been made as soon or almost as soon as it was made even if there were no
patent laws, then it must pronounce the invention obvious and the patent invalid." Roberts, 723
F.2d at 1346 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting). He later commented: "I know that many
lawyers and judges find the language of economics repulsive. Yet the policies that have given
shape to the patent statute are quintessentially economic, and the language of economics is
therefore the natural language in which to articulate the test for obviousness." it at 1347.
71 In Graham, the determination of whether an invention is obvious is made by determining
the scope and content of the prior art, ascertaining differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue, and resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The
economic logic is that, if the obviousness standard provides a suitable "weeding" mechanism for
identifying those inventions that the public would have received without the patent incentive,
society will not have to bear the costs of noninduced patents. See infra text accompanying notes
287-305 (further discussing Graham).
72 SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 10, at 443-50.
73 As stated by Scherer.
[I]t is conceivable that without a patent system certain spectacular technical contribu-
tions-those effecting a genuine revolution in production or consumption patterns-
might be lost or (more plausibly) seriously delayed because their support lends itself
poorly to rational benefit/cost calculation. Such innovations may lie off the beaten
paths of industrial technology, where no firm or group of companies has a natural ad-
vantage; and the innovator may be forced to develop completely new marketing chan-
nels and production facilities to exploit them. They may entail greater technological
and market uncertainties, higher development costs, and longer inception-to-commer-
cialization lags than the vast bulk of all industrial innovation.
Id. at 448. Scherer would categorize black and white television and xerography as revolutionary.
Id. To these may be added numerous other inventions, including, but obviously not limited to,
the airplane, antibiotics, instant photography, lasers, synthetic textiles, tranquilizers, sulfon-
amides, telegraph, telephone, and transistors. See S. GEE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INNOVATION,
AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 161 (1981); UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, REVOLUTIONARY
IDEAS-PATENTS & PROGRESS IN AMERICA (1976).
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the revolutionary type have an uncertain benefit/cost ratio and, thus, are
theorized to depend upon the patent system for their creation because'of
this uncertainty in investment. 74 According to Scherer, revolutionary in-
ventions form the important category of patent-induced inventions in the
sense that, without the inducement provided by the patent system, it is
likely that society would be denied the benefits or have those benefits seri-
ously delayed but for the patent system.75
Another category of inventions defined by Scherer is the high benefit/
cost ratio invention, which predictably provides high benefits to the inves-
tor at relatively low cost.7 6 These tend to be inventions that are market-
induced by the competitive forces to stay ahead of competition with respect
to subject matter within the investor's normal market area. Such inven-
tions may be categorized as nonpatent-induced in the sense that there is a
strong likelihood that these inventions would be created without a patent
system due to market forces and the incentives provided by lead time,
learning curve advantage and market recognition. 77 Also, inventions that
are discovered by accident or by serendipity may be categorized as being
high benefit/cost inventions, as they are fortuitously created rather than
resulting from an investment in a particular type of solution.78
A final category of inventions identified by Scherer that would appear
to be dependent on the inducement of the patent system is the low bene-
fit/cost ratio invention.79 These inventions typically are detail inventions
in markets where there is a high degree of competition. Thus, these inven-
tions would have a relatively horizontal demand curve compared to a
downwardly sloping demand curve usually predicted for patented inven-
tions. These inventions would be categorized as patent-induced in the
sense that there would be little incentive to produce them in a highly com-
petitive market if the improvement could be immediately copied.80
The present author, believing that revolutionary inventions are eco-
nomically important, producing significant social benefits, has proposed
the adoption of a "revolutionary patent" in an attempt to provide an ade-
74 SCHERER, INDUsTRIAR, supra note 10, at 448.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 443-48.
77 Id. at 444-46; see also Oddi, InternationalPatent System, supra note 10, at 838-39; Oddi, Beyond
Obviousness, supra note 10, at 1114-16. Classic examples of high benefit/cost inventions may in-
clude: the pencil with eraser attached (see Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1876), and Rub-
bertip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874) (discussed infra text accompanying
notes 191-96)); the "quick release socket wrench" (see Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d
1324 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (discussed supra note 70 and infra note 247)).
78 See Oddi, Beyond Obvioune, supra note 10, at 1115-16 & n.113 (giving examples of seren-
dipitous inventions, including x-rays, penicillin, vulcanization of rubber, dynamite, and
TEFLON).
79 SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 10, at 448. Examples of low benefit/cost inventions may
be another mousetrap, can opener, or bottle cap.
80 Id Scherer concludes that society would lose little if such inventions were not created
because of the elimination of the patent system. Id. But see Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note
11, at 289 (considering such low benefit/cost inventions to be the important class, concluding
that if the prospect function is taken into account, patents that have little value to their owners
may still perform useful social functions). The rent dissipation theory may have led Grady and
Alexander to the same conclusion-that patents having little value but signalling improvements
are the most likely to be protected. Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 320.
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quate incentive for the creation of such inventions.8 ' The argument is
made that the present patent system inadequately induces such inventions
and that, in fact, the present system discriminates against them because of
limiting interpretations of statutory subject matter and the utility require-
ments for invention, which have a disparate impact on revolutionary inven-
tions.8 2 Because of the inherent difficulty of separating patent-induced
from nonpatent-induced inventions, it was proposed that the grant of a
revolutionary patent would require an enhanced standard for protection,
which was proposed to be "extraordinary to experts" in the relevant art and
would take into account technical, commercial and investment factors in
that evaluation to further insure that the particular invention clearly is one
of revolutionary character.8 3 The intent of such a high standard would be
to eliminate high benefit/cost inventions from this title of protection, be-
cause such inventions are deemed to be costly to society, as they generally
would be induced by the market without the benefit of the patent system.
Two principle criticisms have been leveled at the patent-induced the-
ory. The first is that it discriminates against low cost (high benefit/cost)
inventions and hence promotes wastefulness.8 4 This, of course, would be
true if the patent system actually made it more difficult for low cost inven-
tions to receive patents than for other inventions. The patent system pro-
vides no means for preventing such low cost inventions from being
patented, provided that they meet the standard for patentability of being
new, useful, and nonobvious. Quite to the contrary, it is revolutionary in-
ventions that would appear to be discriminated against, in the sense that
such inventions are more apt to be precluded by doctrinal interpretations
of the utility and statutory classes of invention. Bowman is indeed correct
that wastefulness would be promoted if some sort of utility rate-making sys-
tem were implemented to determine patentability, with those inventions
having high cost being given preference.8 5 The reason for protecting revo-
lutionary inventions as a preferred class is that the uncertainty of the bene-
fit/cost ratio creates a significant risk in investing in such inventions.
Moreover, distinguishing between revolutionary inventions and high bene-
fit/cost inventions can often be done on a basis other than the cost of
developing an invention.8 6
81 Oddi, Beyond Obviousness, supra note 10.
82 1& at 1117-20, 1127-30.
83 id. at 1131-37.
84 BoWMAN, supra note 9, at 39-42; Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 11, at 280-82; Grady
& Alexander, supra note 7, at 312-14.
85 BowMAN, supra note 9, at 41.
86 Bowman illustrates the difficulty of "cost finding" in the creation of invention by the
TEFLON example. BoWMAN, supra note 9, at 39 n.8. TEFLON was accidentally discovered, was
admittedly nonobvious and reaped a huge reward for Du Pont. Thus, it may be clear that the
invention of TEFLON was not patent-induced; however, was its commercialization induced by the
patent system or the market: Would Du Pont have abandoned further work on TEFLON if it
could not have gotten a patent? Would it have relied upon secrecy and still have marketed it?
POST-IT NOTES is given by Grady and Alexander as an example of a product that was serendip-
itously discovered, "revolutionized" its field, and yet was per se unpatentable (presumably be-
cause it was obvious). Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 344. It would appear that it would cost
3M significantly less to develop this product than TEFLON. Were head start, product recogni-
tion, and established marketing channel sufficient incentives?
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The second criticism of the patent-induced theory is that it "simply
fails to explain the cases."87 This is a peculiar criticism, because it is not
apparent that any proponent of this theory has asserted that it does explain
individual cases.88 The patent-induced theory is a macro theory intended
to explain the overall patent system and to predict the overall value of the
patent system based upon the ratio of patent-induced compared to nonpat-
ent-induced inventions.8 9 The higher the ratio the higher probability of
societal benefit The only conclusion to be drawn from the theory is that if
patents were restricted to those inventions that are, in fact, induced by the
patent system, then a net benefit would accrue to society.90
B. Post-Classical Theories
1. Prospect Theory
In a well-received article critiquing Graham v. John Deere Co., Kitch em-
braced the patent-induced theory, agreeing that obvious inventions should
not be protected as they would be forthcoming even in the absence of a
patent system.91 However, a decade later, he recanted and offered, instead,
the prospect theory.92 Kitch defines a "prospect" to be "a particular oppor-
tunity to develop a known technological possibility."93 He analogizes the
patent system to the U.S. mineral claims system, which, he concluded, did
not result in underutilization. 94 Thus, Kitch argues that the normal as-
sumption of a negatively sloped demand curve should not be made; rather
the demand curve should be substantially horizontal, indicating competi-
tion with the patented invention.9 5
In essence, according to Kitch, the patent right could be treated as any
other property right. If a patent is treated as property, the patent owner
would maintain control over the development of the invention, minimize
transaction costs, remove any need for secrecy, and give notice to others of
87 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 312-13.
88 As stated in Oddi, Ureasier Case, supra note 10, at 373-74 n.75: "It should also be made
clear that, while it would be economically desirable for courts to uphold inventions and works of
authorship that are induced by the respective systems compared to noninduced ones, factual
differences and doctrinal concerns make this determination difficult in actual cases."
89 Accordingly, the higher the ratio of patent-induced to nonpatent-induced inventions, the
higher the probability that a net benefit will occur to society because of the patent system.
90 See supra note 43.
91 Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v.John Deere Co., New Standardsfor Patents, 1966 Sup. Or. Ray.
293 (1966). Kitch states:
[T]wo premises ["innovation should be encouraged and patent monopolies represent a
substantial cost to the consumer"] are accommodated by the basic principle on which
the non-obviousness test is based: a patent should not be granted for an innovation
unless the innovation would have been unlikely to have been developed absent the pros-
pect of a patent.
Id at 301.
92 Kitch's reappraisal appears to be based in large part because of Bowman's criticism that
.cost finding" should not be focused on how the invention was made, for this would penalize low
cost inventions. Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 11, at 281-82; see BowMAN, supra note 9, at
39-42.
93 Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 11, at 266.
94 I- at 274.
95 Id.
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the discovery to prevent duplication of efforts.96 Kitch also discards the
nonobviousness standard for invention as being irrelevant to the prospect
theory.97 He would adopt a "substantial novelty" standard as being an "eco-
nomically rational test of patentability."98 The prospect theory thus would
be tantamount to granting property status to technological information
that is substantially novel at an early developmental stage. This would en-
able its owner to exert coordinating control over the future development
of innovations based on that technological information.
The criticisms of the prospect theory are many. First, the assumption
of a horizontal demand curve rather than a downwardly sloping one as the
model for the patent system is strongly contested. 99 It is also urged that the
empirical evidence does not support the theory.100 In addition, because of
the high incentive to be first and the minimum standard for protectability,
there will be high rent dissipation at the conception stage for inventions,
which may far overbalance the limitation of rent dissipation at the innova-
tion stage.' 0 ' Also, the reliance of the theory on commercial success of the
invention for its patentability is unsubstantiated. 10 2 Finally, the prospect
theory does not predict the outcome of actual cases.' 03
2. Race-to-Invent Theory
In 1990, Merges and Nelson proposed a "race-to-invent" theory to de-
scribe the patent system. 104 The underlying premise of this theory is "faster
is better."10 5 This premise is based upon research concluding that the
number of inventions increases with research and development expendi-
tures, productivity increases with the number of inventions, and economic
well-being increases with productivity.10 6 In addition, Merges and Nelson
rely upon empirical studies that indicate that technological development
has been arrested in industries where broad patent protection was granted,
96 Id at 276-80.
97 Id at 280-84.
98 Id.
99 In Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS 31 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Kitch, Patents], Kitch
argues that it is the exceptional case where patents confer monopoly power, citing SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), affd, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), as an exam-
ple. Scherer, in a sharp response, states: "But Xerox as the classic example of monopoly-free
patents? Neither theory nor evidence will support the leap." Frederic M. Scherer, Comment on
Edmund Kitch, in 8 REsEARC H IN LAw AND EcoNoMics 51 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr.
eds., 1986).
100 See Beck, supra note 12, at 199-206 (challenging Kitch's interpretation of empirical evi-
dence relating to the commercialization of inventions, and the scope of protection actually af-
forded by patents); see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 13, at 872.
101 See Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 317. In analyzing Kitch's theory, the authors point
out that: "If new fields of technology promise high patent-rent returns, a rent- dissipating race to
discover the first application may occur, especially if the patent laws afford overly broad protec-
don." Id.; see also McFetridge & Smith, supra note 12, at 203 (prospect function does not assist
market participants seeking to economize common property resources.).
102 See Merges, supra note 13, at 841-42.
103 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 317.
104 Merges & Nelson, supra note 13, at 908.
105 Id. at 878. ("Our argument rests on a simple premise: when it comes to invention and
innovation, faster is better.").
106 Id.
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compared to more rapid development where there was rivalry in the devel-
opment stage.10 7
Because broad protection inhibits competition in improvements,
Merges and Nelson favor limiting the scope of patent protection so that
inventors of significant improvements are placed in a strong bargaining
position vis-a-vis the inventors of basic inventions.' 08 Thus, by limiting the
scope of protection there will be more rapid development in this particular
technological area. This theory is the antithesis of the prospect theory,
which would grant broad coordinating power over future development by
the original inventor. Merges and Nelson refuse to accept the premise that
central coordination is more efficient. Their conclusion is based upon em-
pirical studies that indicate underdevelopment under central coordination
and high transaction costs with respect to the licensing of inventions for
further development. 09
Anticipating that the race-to-invent theory would be considered anti-
patent, Merges and Nelson disclaim this conclusion because the theory
would only apply "to the broader claims of a small number of patents, pri-
marily those on pioneering breakthroughs." 110 This is the antithesis of the
patent-induced theory, which is premised on providing high incentives for
the creation of revolutionary invention, where the cost/benefit analysis is
uncertain. Indeed, one may question why a patent system is needed at all
in a patent system governed by the race-to-invent theory. It would seem
that market-induced incentives, such as lead time, market recognition, and
learning curve advantages, would provide adequate incentives for racing
inventions to the market place. Moreover, secrecy would become highly
important to protect investment in inventions, resulting perhaps in over-
investment in secrecy and excess rent dissipation."' A great deal of rent
dissipation would also occur in the competition to provide improvements
on a basic invention. Such a system may encourage United States' inven-
tors to sit back and wait for basic inventions to be developed by foreigners,
and then immediately race to improve them."12 One final criticism would
be that the race-to-invent theory lacks predictive value, particularly where
broad protection has been afforded to pioneering inventions." 3
107 Id at 877, 884-908 (analyzing electrical lighting industry, automobiles and airplanes, radio,
semiconductors and computers, chemical industries and science-based industries).
108 Id at 876.
109 Id at 872-77.
110 Id at 916.
111 See Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 318 ("Secre y measures may protect the private
reward for innovation, but they can dissipate the social benefit from an innovation.").
112 This has been a pattern injapan: Once a patent application disclosing a basic invention is
published (as required by Japanese patent law), Japanese competitors immediately develop im-
provement inventions and file numerous patent applications, circumscribing the basic invention
with every conceivable improvement. See UNrrED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFMCE, U.S. COM-
PANIEs' PATENT ExPEImENcE IN JAPAN 22-23 (1993) (surveying experience of 900 U.S. firms with
the Japanese patent system). One of the major complaints of U.S. companies againstJapanese
patent practices is the narrow scope of protection afforded to pioneering inventions. Id at 29-31;
see also Patent Protection in Japan, EAsr AsrtA Exzc. REP., Nov. 15, 1993, at 6.
113 The value of the race-to-invent theory as well as the other theories to predict case out-
comes will be evaluated in Part IV.
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3. Rent Dissipation Theory
The final economic theory to be outlined here is the "rent dissipation"
theory as elaborated recently by Grady and Alexander." 4 According to
them, rent dissipation theory posits that society benefits from receiving an
innovation in excess of its development costs, and that the innovator
should receive the difference between what society is willing to pay and the
development cost."1 5 The payment would be a rent (in the form of the
patent monopoly) in order to prevent free-riders from copying the inven-
tion and thereby eliminating the incentive to invest in development. 1 6
They maintain that the defect in the patent system is that the incentives
provided by the system may result in rent dissipation by redundant invest-
ment.1 7 They identify three potential sources of rent dissipation that may
tend to diminish the societal benefit from the patent system. The first is at
the conception stage, where multiple competitors may invest in developing
a basic invention, while only one can receive the patent prize." 8 The sec-
ond is at the improvement stage, where the basic invention may "signal"
various improvements and hence cause excessive competition to develop
those improvements." 9 The third source of rent dissipation is where an
excessive investment may be made in secrecy rather than relying upon the
patent system for protection. 20 Thus, this theory would optimize societal
benefit by minimizing rent dissipation from these three sources. Grady
and Alexander conclude:
Rent dissipation theory predicts that the courts will enforce a patent
when the size of patent rent is proportionate to the rent dissipation that
the inventor's technological signal would otherwise induce. In this situation,
heating up the race to find new patentable inventions is a good social
bargain, because patent enforcement cuts off races to improve. Other-
wise, broad patent protection is unwise.' 2 '
Not only does the rent dissipation explain the entire patent system, but
according to Grady and Alexander, it also "seems to explain actual patent
rulings better than the rules and tests applied by the courts." 2 2 One star-
tling aspect of this assertion is that Grady and Alexander would consider
the worse patent case to be where a "valuable" invention was elegant and so
could not be improved upon; hence, if enforced, it would "clearly induce
114 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7.
115 Id at 308.
116 Id
117 Id. at 308, 316.
118 Id. at 306-07. "In the perverse equilibrium that would result from a system awarding full
control to the inventor who is first, the costs of developing dreams that ultimately fail would equal
or exceed the benefit to society of those that succeed." Id. 307-08.
119 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 308 ("The granting of a patent isjustified... [when
an invention signals improvements] because it eliminates the incentive to engage in wasteful
improvement efforts."). The ability to identify when an improvement is "signaled" would seem
critical to the predictive capability of rent dissipation theory. See infra text accompanying notes
345-61 (critiquing the inherent ambiguity of the term).
120 Id. at 308-09, 318.
121 Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
122 Id at 322. "[T]he desire to limit rent dissipation explains how actual patent cases are
decided, both before and after an invention comes into existence." Id at 308.
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more rent dissipation than it would avoid."123 This would appear to contra-
dict the reward, patent-induced, and prospect theories, and to a degree,
the race-to-invent theory. Applying rent dissipation theory would result in
the ultimate disincentive for investing in the creation of elegant (basic/
revolutionary/pioneer) inventions generally considered the most valuable
to society. Indeed, the rent dissipation theory would predict that: "Most
likely to receive patent protection are inventions that, although of compar-
atively small value, nonetheless signal a large potential for
improvement."124
A primary criticism of the rent dissipation theory is its difficulty of ap-
plication to actual patent cases. How is it to be objectively determined that
rent dissipation is minimized by a particular decision compared to an-
other? As well put by Martin, in his comment on the Grady and Alexander
article: "More fundamentally, how can we know when an invention signals
the possibilities of improvements and when it [does] not.' 25 Moreover, it
is far from clear that all rent dissipation is bad. The competition that pro-
duces the highly beneficial invention may justify an equally large rent.
Even without a patent system, there always will be some rent dissipation, for
the market induces competitive investments. 26
Another criticism leveled by Merges, in his response to the Grady and
Alexander article, is that a number of decisions would have been decided
otherwise except for doctrine applied under the facts of the case and that
some of the cases would be decided differently today under evolved patent
doctrine. 27 One also would be suspicious of a counter-intuitive theory that
predicts the invalidity of a patent on an elegant invention (categorized as
being unimprovable) and that predicts validity of a patent on an inelegant
(detail) invention because it somehow signals improvements. The suspi-
cion is heightened when the assertion is made: 'Just as philosophers have
applied 'Occam's Razor' to their analytical problems, so have patent courts
applied its reverse.' 28
128 1& at 321.
124 Id at 320.
125 Donald L. Martin, Reducing Anticipated Rewards fom Innovation Through Patents: Or Less is
More, 78 VA. L. REv. 351, 356 (1992).
126 Moreover, with respect to process inventions, as pointed out by Merges, secrecy seems to
be the protection of choice, and trade secret may be more desirable than patents, because of the
expense of enforcement and the difficulty of detecting infringement of process inventions. See
Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent Districts: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78
VA. L. REv. 359, 376-77 (1992) [hereinafter Merges, Rent Control].
127 Id at 366-69.
128 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 325. Occam's Razor is defined as: "[A] scientific and
philosophic rule that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily which is interpreted as re-
quiring that the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the more complex or that expla-
nations of unknown phenomena be sought first in terms of known quantities." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 816 (1989). The rule is named after William of Ockham (Occam)
and also called "Law of Economy" or "Law of Parsimony," 8 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA B=RITAicA 867
(15th ed. 1994). Grady and Alexander would reverse this in patent law to the effect that "entities
are to be multiplied beyond necessity" presumably to the effect that patents claiming complicated
(perhaps overly) inventions are more likely to be sustained than those claiming simple ("ele-
gant") ones. Nonetheless, as this Article attempts to demonstrate, once there is "elegance" be-
yond a natural law, patent law seems to prefer the elegant as much as the good Franciscan did in
the fourteenth century and science and philosophy do today.
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C. Generalizations and Comparisons
The chart below attempts to illustrate, in a generalized way, the char-
acteristic outcomes that would be predicted in actual litigation, respec-
tively, by the five theories outlined above. Only the rent dissipation theory
expressly claims and explicates predictive capability. The characteristic
outcome attributed to the other theories in this article have been deduced,
inferred, or extrapolated (with considerable trepidation) from the works of
the various theorists. The five theories are identified on the left margin
and the three characteristics-protectability (statutory subject matter and
utility), conditions for protection (novelty/nonobvious), and the scope of
protection (infringement) -along the right margin for each of the theo-
ries. Along the top margin, three types of inventions are identified-revo-
lutionary (basic/pioneering/elegant), high benefit/cost ratio (market-
induced/improvement), and low benefit/cost ratio (detail).
High Low
Benefit/ Benefit/
Theory Revolutionary Cost Cost
Broad - - Protectability
Reward High High High Standard
Broad Medium Narrow Scope
Patent- Broad - - Protectability
Induced High High High Standard
Broad Narrow Narrow Scope
Broad - - Protectability
Prospect Low Low Low Standard
Broad Broad Broad Scope
Race-to- Narrow - - Protectability
Invent High High High Standard
Narrow Narrow Narrow Scope
Rent Narrow - - Protectability
"Signal "Signal "Signal
Dissipation Strength" Strength" Strength" Standard
"Signaled" "Signaled" "Signaled" Scope
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1. Protectability
The issue of protectability (statutory subject matter and utility) essen-
tially only arises with respect to revolutionary inventions, and, as indicated
on the chart, a broad interpretation of protectability would be posited by
the reward, patent-induced, and prospect theories, while a narrow interpre-
tation would be predicted by the race-to-invent and rent dissipation theo-
ries. A broad interpretation of statutory subject matter and utility is
predicted by reward and patent-induced theories, because these theories
seek to reward and induce revolutionary inventions at the cutting edge of
knowledge. The prospect theory, on the other hand, while predicting a
broad interpretation, does so on the theory that protecting technological
information at an early stage provides the advantages of property. The
race-to-invent theory would appear to predict a narrow interpretation of
statutory subject matter and utility so as not to restrict access to technologi-
cal information at an early stage of conceptualization. On the other hand,
the rent dissipation theory predicts a narrow interpretation for pro-
tectability (particularly with respect to elegant inventions), because it is
posited that such inventions do not signal any improvements and, there-
fore, should not be protected, for otherwise rent dissipation will result. 129
Thus, in general, with respect to the protectability issue for revolution-
ary inventions, the reward, patent-induced, and prospect theories would
tend to predict validity, while the race-to-invent and rent dissipation theo-
ries would tend to predict invalidity.
2. Conditions for Protection
The reward, patent-induced, and race-to-invent theories would all pre-
dict a high standard for protection. Thus, one would expect that a syner-
gism requirement may be imposed and that secondary considerations, such
as commercial success, would not be given high probative value as indicia
of nonobviousness. A high standard would have little effect with respect to
revolutionary inventions, because presumably these are at the cutting edge
of technology. However, a high standard would tend to bar the patentabil-
ity of certain high benefit/cost inventions and many low benefit/cost in-
ventions. This is consistent with the reward theory, in that such inventions
should not be rewarded beyond their contribution to society to avoid the
high costs associated with routine inventions. This is also consistent with
the patent-induced theory in the sense that this theory seeks to eliminate
nonpatent-induced (high benefit/cost inventions), which would presuma-
bly be provided by market incentives rather than by the patent system, and
low benefit/cost (detail) inventions, which may tend to be patent induced,
but which are costly compared to the benefit provided.
In contrast, the race-to-invent theory presumably would impose.a high
standard for protection so as to eliminate patents that may impede access
to improvements, thus permitting more inventions to reach the market-
129 Grady & Alexander, sup ra note 7, at 309 ("When an invention is so basic that it could never
be improved, our theory does not predict patent protection because a patent would only increase
total rent dissipation.").
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place more quickly. The prospect theory, on the other hand, would seem-
ingly impose a low standard for protection ("substantial novelty"), because
of the assumption that most patented inventions face significant competi-
tion and, therefore, would not result in underutilization. Under the rent
dissipation theory, the standard for patentability, in particular, nonobvious-
ness, as well as secondary considerations such as indicia of nonobviousness,
appear irrelevant, and the standard becomes the signal strength included
within the patent disclosure in terms of the invention's potential for im-
provement. 130 With respect to revolutionary (elegant) inventions, the sig-
nal strength by definition is negligible as the invention is unimprovable.
The categorization of inventions as high-benefit/cost and low-benefit/cost
does not fit nicely into the rent dissipation theory. Presumably, patents on
high-benefit/cost inventions would be ones that would signal a potential
for improvement. These inventions are quite valuable to their owners as
they find a ready market, and competitors would be likely to seek improve-
ments unless barred by patents. On the other hand, patents on low-bene-
fit/cost inventions are of limited value to their owners, because they only
protect details in a competitive market, and moreover, presumably signal
little potential for improvement as most of the improvements have already
been made. Yet, rent dissipation theory posits that the inventions most
likely to receive patent protection are those that are of "comparatively
small value" but "nonetheless signal a. large potential for improvement."
3. Scope of Protection
For revolutionary inventions, the reward, patent-induced, and pros-
pect theories would all predict a broad scope of protection, so that literal
and nonliteral infringement (under the doctrine of equivalents and con-
tributory and induced infringement) would be broadly interpreted. The
rationale behind broad protection under the reward and patent-induced
theories is that revolutionary inventions are the important class of inven-
tions to be protected and warrant broad protection as a reward and an
inducement. The prospect theory, on the other hand, would provide
broad protection so that the patent owner could achieve a broad coordinat-
ing function for improvements. In contrast, the race-to-invent and rent
dissipation theories would provide a narrow scope of protection, although
for different reasons. The race-to-invent theory would provide narrow pro-
tection so that competition for improvement inventions would be permissi-
ble to speed up the commercialization of this technology. The rent
dissipation theory predicts at best a narrow scope of protection because
such inventions, particularly the elegant ones, tend to be unimprovable;
therefore, only those improvements that are signaled fall within the scope
of protection.
The reward theory presumably would provide a medium scope of pro-
tection for high benefit/cost and a narrow scope for low benefit/cost in-
ventions, respectively, based upon the rationale that the reward should be
proportional to the contribution. The patent-induced theory, however,
130 Id. at 321.
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would provide a narrow scope of protection for both high benefit/cost and
low benefit/cost invention in order to minimize the costs of protecting
such inventions. The prospect theory would seemingly provide broad pro-
tection for all types of inventions to permit coordination by the owner.
Conversely, the race-to-invent theory, which is the antithesis of the prospect
theory, predicts a narrow scope of protection for all types of inventions to
afford competitors access for improving them. Accordingly, rent dissipa-
tion would seem to suggest a narrow scope of protection for low benefit/
cost (detail) inventions, because most of the improvements have presuma-
bly already been signaled. With respect to high benefit/cost (improve-
ment) inventors, if they signal further improvements, a broad scope of
protection would be predicted.
The scope of protection afforded under the rent dissipation theory
would depend upon the degree to which the patent disclosure signaled the
alleged infringing subject matter. The greater the improvement signaled,
the greater the scope of the patent. Revolutionary (elegant) inventions, if
sustainable at all, would have a quite narrow scope of protection, being
essentially unimprovable. With respect to high-benefit/cost and low-bene-
fit/cost inventions, the rent dissipation theory's predictive value depends
on the ability to identify accused subject matter as being signaled by the
patent disclosure.' 3 '
4. Summary of Predictions
In sum, the reward, patent-induced, and prospect theories would tend
to predict the validity and infringement of revolutionary inventions. The
race-to-invent theories would tend to predict the validity but not the nonin-
fringement of such patents, while the rent dissipation theory would tend to
predict both invalidity and noninfringement. The prospect theory, indeed,
tends to predict the validity and infringement of all patents. The patent-
induced and race-to-invent theories would tend to predict the invalidity
and noninfringement of both high benefit/cost and low benefit/cost in-
ventions, as would the reward theory with respect to low-benefit/cost inven-
tions. With respect to high-benefit/cost inventions, the rent dissipation
theory woul d tend to predict more cases of validity and infringement than
would the reward theory, presuming there is a signal. Aside from the pros-
pect theory, only the rent dissipation theory would tend to predict validity
and infringement of low benefit/cost inventions, according to the degree
to which such inventions can signal improvement.
IV. APPLICATION OF THEORIES
In this Part, the predictive powers of the various theories will be ap-
plied to actual cases. The primary reference will be the rent dissipation
theory, which is the only one asserted to be predictive of actual case out-
come. This theory will be compared primarily to the reward and the pat-
131 Grady and Alexander essentially equate the issues of patentability and infringement as
hinging on the "signal." Id. at 347-48; see infra text accompanying notes 346-62 (discussing impor-
tance of "signals" to rent dissipation theory).
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ent-induced theories and, more generally, to the prospect and race-to-
invent theories. Special attention will be directed to cases involving inven-
tions that are identified as being elegant. When appropriate, the historical
background of certain inventions and their subsequent evolution will also
be examined. Also, cases will be identified that are better explained by
doctrine than by any economic theory and, in particular, the rent dissipa-
tion theory. The cases selected for discussion will generally be those indi-
cated by Grady and Alexander as being best explained by their theory and
supplemented by cases, otherwise identified, that cause considerable diffi-
culty to the rent dissipation theory.
A. Protectability
1. Statutory Subject Matter
The 35 U.S.C. § 101 issue is whether a particular invention falls within
one of the statutory classes of patentable inventions, namely, "process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter." Compliance with § 101 is
a precondition for patentability. If an invention, as claimed, does not fall
within one of these classes, the qualitative issues for patentability, novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility need not be addressed. Grady and Alexander
argue that rent dissipation theory explains statutory subject matter cases
better than doctrine or the other economic theories. This assertion is chal-
lenged in this Article.
Starting with the "process" class, Grady and Alexander first select four
cases to demonstrate the superiority of rent dissipation theory. These are:
O'Reilly v. Morse,132 The Telephone Cases,13 Tilghman v. Proctor,134 and Morton
v. New York Eye Infirmary.l1 5
In Morse, the Supreme Court held invalid claim eight, which claimed
without reference to "specific machinery ... the use of the motive power
of... electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intel-
ligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances .... 136 The Court's
rationale for invalidating this claim was that Morse was claiming exclusive
rights over subject matter "which he has not described and indeed had not
invented."1 37 This rationale is directly in line with reward theory. One
should not be rewarded for what one has not invented. Indeed, Morse had
not discovered electromagnetism as the natural principle. Grady and Alex-
132 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
133 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
134 102 U.S. 707 (1881).
135 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865).
136 Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112. The complete claim reads:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery de-
scribed in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention being the
use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnet-
ism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters,
at any distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to be the first
inventor or discoverer.
Id.
137 Id. at 113.
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ander consider the doctrine to stand for the proposition that a "'principle
of nature' is not a patentable subject matter."13 8
Morse's claim was too broad in another sense. The only distinction
over the prior art and the claim language is the use of "the motive power
of... electro-magnetism... at any distances."139 The prior art permitted
communication at short distances within the power of batteries available at
the time. The novelty of Morse's invention was the use of separate "relay"
circuits and separate batteries that greatly extended the distance over
which telegraphic communications would be transmitted. 40 Nonetheless,
this was not "at any distances;" it took a good many years of development to
extend the distances.' 4'
The invalidation of claim eight is said to be consistent with rent dis-
sipation theory because a claim of this scope would have covered "elec-
tronic communications of all types" and the signal from Morse's invention
lacked the potential to set off a race to invent "analog and digital data
transmissions, telephonic and satellite communications... fax machines,
LEXIS terminals and space probe messages," as well as "cellular tele-
phone [s]," no less.' 42 This reduction to absurdity argument, which claims
to cover every conceivable form of wired and wireless communications,
does not comport with the doctrinal application of claim eight. The claim
is limited to "the use of the motive-power of... electro-magnetism... for
marking or printing intelligible characters... .,143 If this claim were in
effect today, it is improbable that a court would interpret such use of the
motive-power of electromagnetism as encompassing the wireless transmission
of, for example, digital signals, modulated at high frequency and not used
as a driving force for the actual communication.14
138 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 323; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 13, at 850,
who assert that the claim covers "all methods of communicating at a distance using electromag-
netic waves." Whether "the motive power of the electric or galvanic current" can be read upon
"electromagnic waves," e.g., generated at radio frequencies, is questionable. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) at 112.
139 Morse 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112.
140 See id. at 72. The patent to Morse was issued in 1840 and reissued in 1848. Successful
transmission of telegraphic signals between Baltimore and Washington D.C. was made in 1844-a
distance of 40 miles. SeeE. A. MAIUAND, EARLY ELEcTRicAL COMMUNICATION 136-37 (1964). Mar-
land questions whether Morse was the inventor of the "Morse" code. Id. at 134. The author
suggested that Morse obtained the idea for successive circuits from another man. Id. at 136.
141 See, e.g., MARLAND, supra note 140, at 153-81, for a history of underwater telegraph cables.
142 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 323. Moreover, as postulated by Grady and Alexan-
der, it is the patent that must "signal" improvements. Id at 319. Assume that Morse's patent
specification stated that his invention could be used for voice communications but there was no
claim eight. Would the telephone be "signaled" by this disclosure? Would this "signal" bar Bell
from obtaining a patent on the telephone? Would the telephone infringe the Morse patent
(without claim eight), presuming it was still in effect? The telephone "signal" in the Morse patent
presumably would cause rent dissipation by others trying to "improve" Morse's invention unless
the patent were deemed to cover the telephone. It is also interesting to note that fax machines
are contemporaries of the telegraph and antedate the telephone. Patents date back to 1843.
There was a dedicated line between Paris and Lyon for fax communications from 1865-1870. See
IRA FLATOW, THEY ALL LAUGHED 62 (1992); see also infra notes 345-62 and accompanying text(discussing the importance of "signals" to rent dissipation theory).
143 See supra note 136 (quoting complete claim).
144 If claim eight had not been anticipated by prior art, the court could have limited the claim
to what had been disclosed in the patent under the 'reverse doctrine of equivalents." See infra
text accompanying notes 818.28; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 13, at 850-51 (finding the
claim invalid because of a failure to satisfy an "enabling" requirement).
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The patent-induced theory also explains the invalidation of claim
eight. The fact that Morse may have been induced by the availability of a
patent to initiate and continue to work on the telegraph does not override
the reward aspect of the patent-induced theory; inventors should not be
rewarded beyond what they, in fact, invent, however induced to invent.
The invalidation of claim eight is also consistent with the race-to-in-
vent theory, but perhaps inconsistent with sustaining the other claims,
which provided quite broad protection to Morse over the development of
the telegraph. Only the prospect theory would not predict the invalidation
of claim eight, as this would have provided Morse with broader coordinat-
ing control over the development of all communication systems.
Rent dissipation is maintained to explain the outcome of The Telephone
Cases'45 on the basis that Alexander Graham Bell's claims are within the
technology signaled by his inventions. Thus Morse is distinguished:
Morse's claims did not signal, but Bell's did.1 46 Doctrine and historical
background surrounding the invention of the telephone would seem to
explain far better the result in The Telephone Cases. Rent dissipation theory
would appear to be correct that the invention of the telegraph did not
signal the invention of the telephone. Indeed, it may well have retarded
the invention of the telephone. Just prior to the invention of the tele-
phone, both Elisha Gray and Alexander Graham Bell were working on im-
proving telegraphic communication by means of multiplexing.' 47 In the
course of his investigations, Gray made a major breakthrough when he
showed that different musical notes could be sent over wire and be repro-
duced at the other end, demonstrating the feasibility of transmitting voice
over wires.' 48 However, conventional wisdom at the time indicated that the
important technology was the telegraph, and Gray devoted his attention to
improving telegraphy. 49
Bell, on the other hand, took the contrary view and dropped work on
multiplexing for telegraph and pursued voice transmission. 150 Gray had
conceived the telephone before Bell and had, indeed, made a sketch,
which was practically identical to the one made several weeks later by
Bell.151 Bell, however, filed his patent application a few hours before Gray
filed a caveat.152 Gray, on the advice of patent counsel and his financial
145 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
146 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 324. The claim by Bell was: "[T]he method of, and
apparatus for, transmitting vocal or other sounds telegraphically, as herein described, by causing
electrical undulations, similar in form to the vibrations of the air accompanying the said vocal or
other sounds, substantially as set forth." The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 13-14. Unless this claim is
limited to wired transmissions by the word "telegraphically," would this claim read on radio trans-
missions with audio modulation of the radio frequency waves being "similar in form to the vibra-
tions of the air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds"?
147 See THOMAS PARKE HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS 55-56 (1989).
148 See FLATOW, supra note 142, at 76.
149 HUGHES, supra note 147, at 56.
150 I&. His financial bankers were not pleased as they wanted him to work on the telegraph.
See ALVIN F. HARLOW, OLD WIRES AND NEW WAVES 353 (1936).
151 See FLATow, supra note 142, at 82.
152 See HARLow, supra note 150, at 357 (discussing the Patent Office procedure at the time,
where Bell's application was the fifth entry for the day and Gray's caveat the thirty-ninth). No
hour was indicated for the entries. Unlike the procedure of the time, a caveat was a document
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backers, declined to contest Bell's priority on the grounds that the tele-
phone had no commercial future. 153
Shortly thereafter, Western Union became interested in the telephone
and acquired Gray's rights. 54 Western Union also retained Thomas
Edison to develop improvements in the telephone. He invented a trans-
mitter superior to Bell's, which was patented. 155 After extensive litigation,
the controversy between Bell and Western Union was settled. Western
Union gave up its patent rights in telephones, including the Edison trans-
mitter patent, in exchange for 20% of telephone rental income for the life
of the patents. 56
Grady and Alexander attempt to conform the sustaining of the Bell
patent to the rent dissipation theory: "Bell's invention, for instance, no
doubt signaled to other inventors the possibility of valuable refinements
such as an improved voice box. Such improvements, if not covered by
Bell's claims, would have an economic value approximating that of the
original invention.' 57 Evidently contrary to rent dissipation theory, Bell's
claims did not cover Edison's "voice box" or Bell's patent did not signal the
improvement. Indeed, it was a matter of survival for Bell Telephone to
obtain a commercially viable transmitter to compete with Edison's trans-
filed to establish the conception of an invention that had not yet been reduced to practice.
Harlow comments:
Had the clerk entered on his blotter the hour when each of these applications was filed,
much litigation and bitter feeling might have been averted in the years that followed. As
it was, it was believed by some for years afterwards that Gray was first with his applica-
tion. It was charged under oath that being filed first, it lay near the bottom of the day's
papers, and therefore, at the close of the day's business, was entered among the last on
the records-Bell's entry being the fifth and Gray's the thirty-ninth. This theory was
repudiated by the Patent Office officials, and the averment was gradually built up that
Gray had arrived at the office two hours later than Bell's attorney. Thirty-four applica-
tions for patents and caveats must have made that an unusually busy two hours for the
office. All charges, counter-charges and denials were made long after the event. Gray at
first and for months afterward meekly accepted the theory that he had been beaten.
What a crude system is ours for handling such matters! What a discredit to the
boasted human ingenuity andjusticel Why must invention be always a race in which the
prize and the only prize is awarded to the swift, or a battle in which all the honors and
emoluments are handed over to the strongest and most ruthless mauler? Haroun-al-
Raschid would have thought of a better plan.
Id. In a near contemporaneous account, prior to Bell's first inventorship being established in the
Telephone Cases, Count Du Moncel maintains that Gray's caveat was more than a mere conception
but disclosed the telephone in significantly more detail than Bell's patent application and indeed
disclosed a telephone that "would work perfectly." He concludes that: "Mr. Elisha Gray would
certainly have obtained the patent, if the expiration of his caveat had not been the result of an
omission of form in the Patent Office . . . ." CouNT Du MONCEL, THE TELEPHONE, THE
MICROPHONE AND THE PHONOGRAPH 16 (1879, reprinted 1974); cf. HERBERT N. CASSON, THE
I-ISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE 90-93 (1910) (Casson's critical account of Gray's claim of first
inventorship).
153 See FLATOW, supra note 142, at 83.
154 See HARLoW, supra note 149, at 375.
155 Robert V. Bruce, Alexander Graham Bell and the Conquest of Solitude, in TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 105, 111 (Caroll W. Pursell,Jr. ed., 1981). Bell had offered his patent to Western Union
for $100,000, which was refused. FLATOW, supra note 142, at 83.
156 Bruce, supra note 155, at 111. The Bell company also agreed to stay out of the telegraph
business. See HARLow, supra note 150, at 382-83.
157 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 316.
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mitter.158 This was accomplished by the acquisition of the patent rights
from Emil Berliner to a transmitter of equivalent quality. 159 Both Ber-
liner's and Edison's transmitters were ultimately used by Bell Telephone.160
The Bell and Edison patents were "blocking" patents. Western Union
could not market telephones, and Bell needed a better transmitter for its
telephone to be successful. Fortunately for Bell, the acquisition of the Ber-
liner transmitter circumvented the block. 16'
The result in The Telephone Cases is nicely explained by both the reward
and patent-induced theories. The telephone was clearly a patent-induced
invention, and Bell should have been rewarded for his revolutionary inven-
tion. The magnitude of his reward was indeed tremendous, as the tele-
phone patent is considered one of the most economically valuable in
history.162
The result in The Telephone Cases is also consistent with the prospect
theory, with Bell Telephone acting as the coordinator for the industry.
However, some problems arise with respect to the race-to-invent theory.
The settlement of the Bell patent litigation resulted in the Bell company
controlling the telephone industry and Western Union controlling the tele-
graph industry-perhaps to the detriment of their rapid development.
In Tilghman v. Proctor'63 the Supreme Court sustained the sole claim
of Tilghman's patent, which involved "the manufacturing of fat acids and
glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature
and pressure."' 64 The Court distinguished Morse on the basis that Morse's
claim was "not for a process, but a mere principle," while Tilghman's claim
was a process using the principle. 165 The Court refused to hold that Tilgh-
man's invention lacked novelty because although fat acids "were acciden-
tally and unwittingly produced" in previously used processes, the
underlying principle of the invention was not recognized.
66
Rent dissipation theory is said to explain this result, because if Tilgh-
man had received a narrower patent, a race to patent improvements sig-
naled by the original invention would have been set off.16 7 Nonetheless,
this is exactly what happened, even with the broad claim. Proctor and
Gamble took a license under Tilghman's patent and then presumably im-
proved it to make it commercially viable by adding lime, which permitted
158 Theodore Vail was' brought in as manager of the Bell Company, according to Harlow,
"with full knowledge of the fact that the Bell telephone must have a transmitter as good as
Edison's or perish." HARLOW, supra note 150, at 379-80.
159 I- at 377-81.
160 I1. at 385. There was disagreement over which transmitter was better, and telephones
were supplied at the request of the Pennsylvania Railroad with both transmitters installed side-by-
side. Id. at 386-87.
161 As pointed out by Merges, Rent Contro, supra note 126, at 379-80 n.73: "In terms of the
rent dissipation model, signalling appears to be measured only as of the filing date. Thus, per-
haps Grady and Alexander would not permit blocking patents to issue."
162 See Bruce, supra note 155, at 111.
163 102 U.S. 707 (1881).
164 Id. at 709 (quoting Tilghman's patent, No. 11,766, Oct. 3, 1854).
165 Id. at 726-30.
166 I& at 711-12. Merges would categorize this as a novelty case, establishing the principle that
the unrecognized disclosure of the process does not qualify it as prior art. Merges, Rent Contro
supra note 126, at 367.
167 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 325.
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the reduction in water temperature. 168 Proctor and Gamble thus dissi-
pated rent in developing the invention to the commercial stage, for which
it was forced to pay a rent. If the improvements made by Proctor and Gam-
ble were obvious, it would then appear that sustaining the Tilghman claim
was justified.169 However, protection beyond signals that were obvious
would appear to introduce cost into the patent system.
Grady and Alexander argue that the reward theory fails to explain
Tilghman: "Why reward monopoly profits in an area beyond the imagina-
tion and labor of the inventor?" 170 But should not Tilghman be rewarded
within the scope of obvious improvements-adding lime to reduce the
water temperature? The patent-induced theory would explain the result.
The patent system would be particularly important to Tilghman, an in-
dependent chemist, who would most likely have to rely upon others for the
commercialization of his invention by licensing.
Race-to-invent theorists would be troubled by this case because of the
retarding effect on improvements, particularly if Proctor and Gamble's im-
provement was nonobvious. The case, however, would be consistent with
prospect theory, with Tilghman controlling the development of this partic-
ular art. Nonetheless, one might anticipate that Proctor and Gamble may
have been better equipped to coordinate that development.
Grady and Alexander cited Morton v. New York Eye Infirmayl7 to illus-
trate the superiority of rent dissipation as a predictive theory of case out-
come. They go so far to assert: "We think it virtually impossible to explain
Morton under the reward theory of patent law."' 72 The explanatory power
of the reward theory would be more evident, of course, if the assumptions
were not made that the case was rightly decided at the time and would be
decided the same way today.
The explanatory power under the rent dissipation theory rests upon
the categorization of the use of ether as an anesthetic agent as being ele-
gant (i.e., unimprovable) and hence a patent was not required to stave off a
race to improve.' 73 As part of the factual background, Grady and Alexan-
der state: "Although the intoxicating effects of ether were well-known at
that time, its potential for anesthetic use was not known until the paten-
tees, Jackson and Morton, did their path-breaking work." 174 It is generally
168 Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 733.
169 As stated by the Court:
It is probably true, as contended for by the defendants, that by the use of a small portion
of lime, the process can be performed with less heat than if none is used. It may be an
improvement to use the lime for that purpose; but the process remains substantially the
same. The patent cannot be evaded in that way.
I&
170 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 324.
171 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865).
172 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 326.
173 Md at 325-26.
174 IR. at 325-26. Cf Attorney General Cushing's opinion:
I think that, in the matter of which came this patent, a signal public service was per-
formed, honorable to the parties and to their country. It was not the discoveiy of the
anodyne effect of the inhalation of the ether or other anaesthetic agents. It was not the
invention of the performance of surgial operations on the human body while reduced
to temporary insensibility by anaesthesia. These were ideas familiar for ages to men of
science, and the invention or discovery of which no more belongs to any individual as
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agreed that Jackson did very little, if anything, with respect to this inven-
tion.17 5 The question of whether or not Morton himself was the first inven-
tor of using ether as an anesthetic agent in operations is subject to serious
debate. A case can be made that Dr. Crawford W. Long had used ether in
an operation as early as 1842, approximately six years prior to Morton. 7 6
As to the elegance of the use of ether as an anesthetic agent, chloroform
appeared to be a strong competitor, particularly in the South during these
early years.177
Most damaging to the rent dissipation theory in the Morton case would
be a direct application of Occam's Razor.178 Simply, the case was wrongly
property, than electricity; the fusibility of metals; the specific medicinal effects of opium,
cinchona, mercury; the capacity of sleep, which Cervantes speaks of as a valuable inven-
tion; or any other of the ascertained qualities of matter, functions of animal life, or laws
of inanimate nature. Neither of those things constitutes the honorable service per-
formed in the present instance. That service consisted in the suggestion and execution
of a series of experiments, which resulted in demonstrating the safety and utility of
employing, more frequently than had been done heretofore, known agents of anaesthe-
sia, by known methods, in order to the known end of facilitating surgical operations.
That was a great good, and worthy of due honor. Whether it involved anything patenta-
ble or not, from which to derive pecuniary profit, is a question of specific agents and of
specific agency. If it does, that relation of the case belongs to the lower category of
mechanical applications, not to the higher one of great scientific discoveries.
Morton's Anaesthetic Patent, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 269, 278-79 (1856).
175 See, e.g., BARBARA M. DUNCUM, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INHALATION ANAESTHESLA 103-04
(1947). Morton discussed the use of nitrous oxide and ether with Jackson, but withheld the fact
that he had experimented with ether. Duncum comments on their relationship:
Upon this last point Morton probably overestimated his powers of concealment and
underestimated Jackson's perspicacity. In any case it was an irony of fate that Morton,
with his fear of being forestalled and his subterfuges to prevent such a happenfng,
should have turned toJackson for information. For although Jackson was undoubtedly
a distinguished scholar, particularly in the science of geology, he had a deplorable ten-
dency, upon the most slender grounds, to try to father other people's inventions which
gave promise of being outstandingly successful especially from a financial point of view.
Within three months Jackson claimed that at this very interview he had suggested to
Morton the use of ether vapour as an inhalant to obviate surgical pain.
Id.
176 Id. at 89-93. Dr. Long was a physician practicing in ruralJefferson, Georgia, who reported
that he used ether as an anesthetic on March 30, 1842 to remove a tumor from a boy's neck.
However, Long did not publicly disclose his successful use of ether in operations until 1852, six
years after Morton's well publicized use of ether in 1846. For rather poignant and expectedly
partial accounts of the work of Morton and Long, see Wi.uAMJ. MORTON, M.D., THE INVENTION
OF ANAES-rHETmc INHALATION; OR, DISCOVERY OF ANAESTHESIA. (1880) (by Dr. Morton's son) and
FRANCES LONG TAYLOR, CRAwFoRD W. LONG AND THE DISCOVERY OF ETHER ANEsTHESIA (1928) (by
Dr. Long's daughter).
177 See DUNCUM, supra note 175, at 11-15. There also appears to have been significant rent
dissipation in perfecting a mechanism for administration of ether. When the physicians at Massa-
chusetts General found out that Morton was applying for a patent to protect his inhalation de-
vice, they discontinued its use and poured ether directly onto a bell-shaped sponge, which was
applied both over the mouth and nose of the patient. Id. at 11. Moreover, during the period
1846-1847, immediately following the public disclosure of the use of ether for anesthesia, a large
number of inhalers were developed throughout the world. I& at 130-63.
178 The same criticism can be leveled at other cases relied upon by Grady and Alexander. For
example, they cite an obscure case, In re Haas, 81 F.2d 408 (C.C.P.A. 1936), as another example
of an "elegant" invention, where the rent dissipation theory explains the result better than the
doctrine actually applied by the court. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 327. Haas
claimed: "A method of slicing and wrapping bread which consists in [sic] moving the bread
through a zone of sterilized air, slicing the bread in said air, and finally wrapping said bread in
said sterilized air." Haas, 81 F.2d at 409. The court held that this did not amount to "invention"
in that the inventor had merely discovered the scientific fact that the blades were the contami-
nants in slicing bread, and it was obvious to sterilize the blades in view of prior art teaching
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decided. The definition of "process" found in § 100(b) of the 1952 Patent
Act reverses Morton: "The term 'process' means process, art or method,
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, compo-
sition of matter, or material." Under this definition, the Morton invention
would qualify as statutory subject matter as a "new use" for a known "com-
position of matter, or material," i.e., ether. This type of method invention
was approved by the Patent Office and courts even prior to the 1952
codification. 179
In Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,' 80 the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the patentability of a process that involved the use of a known
composition of matter (propanil) for controlling weeds in rice fields. In
view of the statutory definition of new use inventions and the Dawson Chemi-
cal case, it would seem "virtually impossible" to maintain that Morton is still
good law.181 Obviously, while not as great a benefit to society as the use of
ether as an anesthetic agent, the use of propanil as a herbicide was even
more elegant, as propanil had no other known use but as a herbicide. 82
Section 100(b) and Dawson Chemical are fully consistent with the re-
ward theory. Had Morton been correctly decided, Morton would have been
appropriately rewarded for whatever contribution he made. According to
the patent-induced theory, the result in Morton can be justified, for it was
likely that the use of ether for anesthesia would have been discovered soon
irrespective of the patent system; thus, awarding the patent was unneces-
sary. The prospect theory would not predict the actual outcome in Morton.
Of course, if the invention were truly unimprovable, there would be little to
coordinate aside from collecting royalties. The race-to-invent theory would
similar sterilizations. Id. at 410. Grady and Alexander disagree with the court's conclusion that
the invention was obvious. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 327. Nonetheless, it is another
matter to categorize the invention as "elegant" and therefore unimprovable and hence unpro-
tectable. The simple solution would be to conclude that the case was wrongly decided on the
"invention" issue. In hindsight, the inventor would have been well advised to keep the process
secret rather than to have applied for a patent.
Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107), and Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780 (1877), are cited for examples of process cases that are better explained by rent dissipa-
tion theory than by the mere function-of-the-machine doctrine. See Grady & Alexander, supra
note 7, at 328. As this doctrine is no longer applied (see In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856
(C.C.P.A. 1968)), this itself would eliminate any perceived inconsistency with the result in Wyeth,
where the claims were held invalid, compared to Cochrane, where the claims were sustained. The
reward theory nicely explains both cases. Wyeth had not invented all methods of cutting ice into
a uniform shape and therefore deserved no reward for uninvented ones, while Cochrane did
deserve a reward for his contribution to the art of a specific method of separating flour from
meal.
179 See, e.g., Tolfree v. Wetzler, 25 F.2d 553 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 628 (1928); Exparte
Muller, 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 261 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1947); see also 1 DONALD L. CHISUM, PATENTS
§ 1.03[8] [C] (1995) (discussing cases involving new use inventions).
180 448 U.S. 176 (1980); see also Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 833 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988) (involving new use for potassium nitrate).
181 See PAUL GOLDsTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEm ARIK AND RELATED STATE DOCrRINES 444
(3d ed. 1993):
The new definition [35 U.S.C. § 101(b)] also dispelled the lingering question left by a
much earlier decision, Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary... which held that plaintiffs, who
had discovered the anesthetic qualities of the old compound, ether, were not entitled to
a patent on the process of using ether as an anesthetic in surgery.
Id.
182 Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 182.
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seem to support the result in Morton, particularly in view of the rapid com-
mercialization of the method and also the considerable competition to im-
prove the inhalation device used to apply the ether. s3
Grady and Alexander appear to have it backwards with respect to
§ 101 cases decided by the Supreme Court relating to computer programs.
They categorize the invention in Gottschalk v. Benson184 for converting pure
binary into binary decimal numbers as being elegant and, accordingly,
unimprovable. 185 Hence, rent dissipation theory explains the result that
the claimed invention (categorized as an algorithm) was not within the
statutory classes of invention. In contrast, they conclude that the invention
of a computer-program-controlled rubber curing process as claimed in Dia-
mond v. Diehr 86 was considerably less elegant than that in Benson and thus
signaled various improvements. 187
In the first place, it is not apparent that the Benson invention was all
that elegant. The claims are for a specific type of conversion, using particu-
lar logic elements.'88 Moreover, whatever elegance may have existed was
183 See supra note 177.
184 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
185 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 329.
186 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
187 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 324-30.
188 For example, claim eight of the Benson application reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into binary which
comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a binary '1' to
the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary '1' in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1' to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a '1' to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a suc-
ceeding binary '1' in the second position of said register.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 73-74 (Appendix). The conclusion by Grady and Alexander that the al-
gorithm claimed in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), relating to alarm updating, would be
categorized as "elegant" and would be infringed by the calculation of GPA's and batting averages
is seriously questioned. Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 329 n. 94. Claim one of the Flook
application reads:
A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at least one process
variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocar-
bons wherein said alarm limit has a current value of
Bo+K
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm offset which
comprises:
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present value being
defined as PVL;
(2) Determining a new alarm base BI; using the following equation:
B1 = Bo(1.0-F)+PVL(F)
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0;
(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as Bl+K; and thereafter
(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.
Parker, 437 U.S. at 596-97 (Appendix). There certainly is no indication that the invention was for
any general system of calculation, but was directed to a specific technology. Cf Justice Douglas'
comment in Benson, 409 U.S. at 68: "The end use [of the BC to BCD conversion] may... vary
from the operation of a train to verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law books for
precedents . .. ."
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soon lost, as conversion from pure binary to binary coded decimal proved
inefficient for calculations. 189 On the other hand, if any invention could
be categorized as being elegant in the sense of being unimprovable, it
would appear to be the Diehr invention. The only novel element in the
process was the use of a computer program to solve a well known equation
used for calculating the cure time in a molded rubber process. What could
be improved? The process and the apparatus used were well known, and it
would appear that any computer program capable of solving the equation
would result in infringement. Hence, according to rent dissipation theory,
no patent was needed since the invention was unimprovable.
It may be admitted that the reward theory does not explain the result
in Benson. The elegant response is that the case was wrongly decided. 190
Various decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have
made serious inroads into Benson.'9 '
Reward theory would seem to explain Diehras providing a contribution
to the rubber curing art. Patent-induced theory, however, would seem to
explain Benson, because, in all likelihood, if this were such a simple, elegant
invention it would have been invented irrespective of the patent system.
The same, however, would seem to be true with respect to Diehr-all that
was needed was a computer program to perfect the curing process.
The race-to-invent theory would be consistent with Benson but not
Diehr. A broad patent on the conversion of binary to binary coded decimal
would retard developments, as would a broad patent on the computer con-
trol of an old process. The prospect theory would fail to explain Benson but
would explain Diehr, as permitting the coordination of the development of
189 As one author noted:
BCD is not often used in modem high-speed digital computers for two good reasons.
First, as was already pointed out, the BCD code for a given decimal number requires
more bits than the straight binary code and is therefore less efficient. This is important
in digital computers because the number of places in memory where these bits can be
stored is limited. Second, the arithmetic processes for numbers represented in BCD
code are more complicated than straight binary and thus require more complex cir-
cuitry. The more complex circuitry contributes to a decrease in the speed at which
arithmetic operations take place. Calculators that use BCD are therefore considerably
slower in their operation than computers.
RONALDJ. Tocci, DrcrrAL SwsmTis 27-28 (1985).
190 See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 959 (1986)
[hereinafter Chisum, Algorithms] (severely criticizing the Benson decision). Cf Pamela Samuel-
son, Benson Revisitied: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-
Related Inventions, 39 EMORY LJ. 1025 (1990). The present author tends to agree with Chisum.
See Oddi, Uneasier Case, supra note 10, at 414-16.
191 See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that a program-
med computer is a "machine" under § 101); Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a method of analyzing electrocardiograph
signals is a statutory subject matter); In relwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reciting "read
only memory" as sufficient to avoid § 101 rejection as an algorithm); see also cases collected in
Samueson, supra note 190, at 1113-22; Oddi, Uneasier Case, supra note 10, at 412-16, 427-29; Rich-
ard H. Stem, Tales from the Algorithm War Benson to Iwahashi, It's Dda Vu All Over Again, 18
A.I.P.LA. QJ. 371, 376 ("Iwahashi for all practical purposes, goes back to the CCPA's immedi-
ately pre-Benson standard."); cf. In reTrovato, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding
methods and approaches for solving "shortest path problem" in computer graph theory not statu-
tory subject matter); In reWarmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (method of creating data
structure for controlling motion of object not statutory subject matter, but apparatus is); In re
Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (method of doing business nonstatutory as preempting
mathematical algorithm).
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this art; however, as explained previously, there appears to be little to be
improved.
The pencil/eraser cases (Reckendorfer v. Faber92 and Rubber Tip Pencil Co.
v. Howard)'93 are said to be analogous to Morton and to be best explained
by rent dissipation theory.194 The invention claimed in these patents was a
combination including a pencil that incorporated an eraser at one end.
The patent was held invalid in both cases on the basis that they did not rise
to the requisite level of "invention." Rent dissipation theory is said to pro-
vide a better explanation because, like Morton's ether anesthesia, the pen-
cil/eraser was "too valuable relative to the amount of improvement-stage
rent dissipation that patent enforcement would alleviate."195
The pencil/eraser cases, of course, are not statutory subject matter cases;
thus the reward theory would explain them on the basis that no reward
should be provided for lack of invention in terms of novelty or nonobvious-
ness. The pencil/eraser cases are perhaps even better explained by the pat-
ent-induced theory. These inventions would find a huge market and would
have been invented by market forces whether or not there was a patent
system.' 96 The cases would be analogous to Morton in the sense that highly
marketable and low-cost inventions generally do not need the patent incen-
tive to be created - the market itself is sufficient. On the other hand, the
prospect theory would support the validity of these patents, provided the
minimum standard of "substantial novelty" had been met. Conversely, the
race-to-invent theory would predict the outcome in these cases, thus per-
mitting competition to further develop the pencil art as rapidly as
possible.197
Two cases relating to the statutory class of "manufactures" are said to
be irreconcilable on doctrinal grounds but can be reconciled under rent
dissipation theory.198 In American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex,199 the Supreme
Court held that a chemically impregnated orange was not a "manufacture."
In contrast, in Steinfur Patent Corps. v. William Beyer, Inc.,200 a patent on a
process of dyeing animal furs to lighter colors was sustained by the Second
Circuit. Rent dissipation is said to rationalize these presumably conflicting
decisions on the basis that the invention in Brogdex was elegant and hence
unimprovable, while in Steinfur, the invention was more complicated and
hence signaled numerous improvements.20' The Occam's Razor way of ra-
tionalizing the cases is to conclude that the Supreme Court was wrong in
concluding that an impregnated orange was not a "manufacture." Indeed,
192 92 U.S. 347 (1876).
193 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874).
194 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 330-31.
195 Id. at 331.
196 Pencils with an eraser inserted at one end of the shaft became known as "penny pencils."
These could still be purchased in the early 1940s for less than a penny. It is estimated that by the
first decades of the twentieth century about 90% of all pencils came with erasers attached. See
HENRY PETROSmi, THE PENCIL 177-78 (1990).
197 Perhaps such development would include mechanical pencils with affixed and even re-
placeable erasers. Were these improvements "signaled"?
198 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 332-33.
199 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
200 62 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1932).
201 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 333.
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process claims in this patent were held invalid for lack of novelty; a prior
art patent taught impregnation plus coating fruit with gelatin.20 2 Impreg-
nating fruit clearly anticipated the Brogdex invention, the gelatin step being
irrelevant for doctrinal purposes.203 The prior art teaching also would
clearly anticipate the "manufacture," because it taught a product that had
been impregnated. All theories support the nonpatentability of inventions
that lack novelty.2 0 4
With respect to the final category of statutory subject matter in § 101,
"composition of matter," Grady and Alexander insist that two Supreme
Court cases relating to this issue are doctrinally irreconcilable. These are
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.20 5 (invalidating claims to noninhibit-
ing strains of bacteria) and Diamond v. Chakrabar&0 6 (sustaining claims to a
crude oil-eating microorganism). The rationale again under rent dissipa-
tion theory is to pigeonhole Bond's invention in Funk as being elegant (i.e.,
unimprovable), thus not requiring a patent to inhibit rent dissipation at
the improvement stage.20 7 Contrary to this, the Chakrabarty invention is
categorized as inelegant, thus signaling improvements, which, in the ab-
sence of the patent, would cause rent dissipation. 208 The Supreme Court's
rationale in Funk was to categorize the "qualities of these bacteria [rhizo-
bia]" to be "manifestations of the laws of nature, free to all men and re-
served exclusively to none," and hence a patent could not be granted for
the discovery of the "hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature. '209
Surely this is inconsistent with the doctrine in Chakrabarty, in that both
claim living matter created by humans, rather than being "discovered;"
again, the elegant resolution is that Funk was wrongly decided, and if it
arose today, a contrary result would be reached.
In terms of the elegance of the invention in Funk, it may be noted that
crop rotation had solved the problem of nitrogen fixation for millennia. 210
Also, the use of crop-specific rhizobia worked quite well. 21 1 Moreover,
Bond's invention was ill-timed. Nitrogen fertilizers came into widespread
202 "If it be assumed that the process claims under consideration cover an invention, we think
this lacked novelty .... The underlying conception had been adequately revealed in Bishop's
Patent of 1901." Brogdex, 288 U.S. at 13.
203 Id- at 14.
204 Grady and Alexander distinguish Steinfur on the basis that it was a "complicated process
that might easily suggest improvements." Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 333. It might be
just as easy to say that the complicated process had been improved to perfection. The Second
Circuit distinguished Brogdex on the ground that the bleached furs had a new beneficial use
compared to the same use for the impregnated orange. Steinfur, 62 F.2d at 240. Whether one
agrees with this distinction or not, it does not appear to relate to the complexity of the dying
process but to the resulting product-the dyed furs as the "manufacture."
205 333 U.S. 127 (1948). Professor Chisum would interpret Funk as "an interpretation of the
nonobviousness or 'invention' requirement, and not of the statutory classes of subject matter."
CHISUM, supra note 179, § 1.02[7], at 1-37.
206 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
207 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 334.
208 I at 334-35.
209 Funk, 333 U.S. at 130.
210 See WiLLIAm D.P. STEWART, Nrraoc;E FIXATION IN PLANTS 11 (1966) ("Their beneficial ef-
fect on the soil... was realized by the ancient Chinese, Greeks, and Romans, so that the wide-
spread use of legumes in crop rotation was well established long before the reason why they were
beneficial was discovered.").
211 See id. at 119.
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use after Word War 11.212 Today the concern is whether the right rhizobia
is present to optimize nitrogen fixation. A multi-strain inoculation may be
used to inhibit naturally occurring competitive rhizobia.2 13
With respect to Chakrabarty's invention, even though asserted to have
signaled improvements, it was never commercially exploited: The microor-
ganism evidently did not have much of an appetite for crude oil.2 1 4 Also,
concerns about the introduction of genetically engineered microorganisms
into the environment weighed against commercialization. 2 15 Attention has
now turned to naturally occurring microbes for oil spill clean-ups and
other bioremediation applications. 21 6
A recurring problem in patent law is whether claims should be granted
on only the process for making a product or on both the process and the
product. This was the issue in Chakrabarty, where the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) had allowed claims on the process of producing the
microorganism and on the combination of the microorganism disposed on
a carrier (e.g., straw). In addition, the applicant insisted on a patent on the
microorganism itself 2 1 7 Rent dissipation theory is said to explain allegedly
inconsistent opinions by courts with respect to granting only process claims
sometimes and both process and product claims at others.2 18 Merck & Co.
v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.2 19 is given as an example where product
claims were upheld for a "vitamin B-12 active composition,"220 which the
court categorized as being previously "unidentified and unknown,"22 ' even
though vitamin B was "produced in minute quantities in the bodies of cat-
tle."2 22 According to rent dissipation theory, the product claims were justi-
fied because without such claims, a race for others to find other methods of
synthesizing the composition would result.2 23 On the other hand, where
the product was already known, such as in Cochrane v. Badische Anilin &
Soda Fabrik,224 only process claims would be justified, because it would be
unlikely that others would dissipate rent in searching for alternative meth-
ods of making the known substance.2 2 5 Both of these cases are consistent
with well established patent doctrine. Whatever the statutory class of inven-
tion, all claims must satisfy all the requirements for the invention. No the-
212 William E. Newton & Barbara K. Burgess, Nitrogen Fixation: Its Scope and Importance, in
NITROGEN FIXATION 1, 2 (Achim Mfiller & William E. Newton eds., 1983).
213 R.J. Roughly, The Production of High Quality Inoculants and their Contribution to Legume Yield,
in SYMBIOTic NITROGEN FrXATION IN PLANTS 125, 126 (P. S. Nutman, ed., 1976) ("[I] t is desirable
to use the best strain available for a particular legume in order to avoid developing problems of
competition from less effective strains.").
214 See BarnabyJ. Feder, Toxic Waste: Bacteria to the Rescue, N.Y. TiMEs,June 27, 1990, at D1, D7
("Mr. Chakrabarty's microbe performed too poorly to have any commercial value, so the question
of releasing it never arose.").
215 See Dahlem, Las Vegas Told of Toxic-Degrading Genes, 10 BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH 4
(1990).
216 See Mimi Bluestone et al., Microbes to the Rescue, CHEM. W., Oct 29, 1986, at 34.
217 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1980).
218 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 336-38.
219 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
220 Id at 157 (claim one).
221 Id. at 163.
222 Id. at 161.
223 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 337.
224 111 U.S. 293 (1884).
225 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 337.
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ory would justify a grant of a patent on a product already in the public
domain. Of course, only in those instances where there is a new, useful,
and nonobvious product and a new, useful, and nonobvious process for
making that product are both categories of claims authorized. Granting
product claims for purifying a known composition of matter would seem to
induce rent dissipation at the conception stage.
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,226 which involves only
method claims for using propanil as an herbicide in rice fields, is another
example of the explanatory failure of rent dissipation theory. Propanil was
a known compound, and the patent on the compound had been held inva-
lid on the ground of lack of novelty.227 Propanil had no other known uses
and the claimed process could not be' improved; therefore, rent dissipation
would predict that no patent should have been granted. Moreover, protec-
tion of the process was tantamount to protection of the product (propanil)
because the product could be used in no other way. It may well be that
sustaining such patents will set off a race to find uses for presently useless
compounds.228
Finally, a class of cases largely ignored by Grady and Alexander involve
pharmaceutical inventions, where the compound patented is elegant in the
sense of being unimprovable. 229 The spotted history of patent protection
on aspirin highlights the difficulty of rent dissipation as a predictive the-
ory.23 0 The invention of aspirin by Felx Hoffman in 1897 involved the syn-
thesis of acetylsalicylic acid (ASA) in a pure form. The active ingredient
(salicin) had been known to have therapeutic value since, at least, the time
of Hippocrates. 23' Less pure versions, however, had severe side effects. 232
A crude form of ASA had been synthesized in 1853 by Gerhardt and a
purer version in 1869 by Kraut.2 33 It has been said: "Hoffman found ASA
226 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
227 I& at 181-82. The patent on propanil was assigned to Monsanto and found invalid in
Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 456 F.2d 592 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972). Rohm & Haas obtained the patent at issue in Davison
Chem. when it prevailed over Monsanto in an interference over who was the first inventor of the
use of propanil as an herbicide. Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 182 n.1.
228 This was considered a desirable end by the majority in Dawson Chem. Dawson Chem., 448
U.S. at 221-22.
229 These pharmaceuticals tend not only to be unimprovable from a technological standpoint
but also from the standpoint of the disincentive for improvement because of the highly expensive
and lengthy approval process before the Food and Drug Administration.
230 See CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLuMMER, THE AsPirN WARS: MONEY, MEDICINE AND 100
YEARS OF RAMPANT COMPErrON (1991) for a history of the development of the aspirin industry.
They summarize the trademark status of the word "aspirin":
In some nations, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, aspirin is
the common name for the chemical acetylsalicylic acid, and any company may use that
name to describe its product. But ASPIRIN@ is a registered trademark of Bayer AG,
Germany, in approximately seventy countries worldwide. And in Canada, it is a regis-
tered trademark used exclusively to identify analgesics manufactured and distributed by
Sterling-Winthrop, Inc.
Id. at 4. In Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (L. Hand,J.), the trademark
"Aspirin" was held to be generic for the general public but still had trademark significance for
manufacturing chemists, physicians and retail druggists.
231 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 230, at 21.
232 Id. at 22, 25.
233 Id. at 25.
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not so much in the laboratory as in the library."234 Hoffman was denied a
German patent on the product ASA, because, at the time, only processes
were protected, and he was denied a patent on the process because it was
held not to be new.235
In contrast, patents were granted on ASA in England and the United
States. The patent was held invalid in England 236 but sustained in the
United States in Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co.237 The U.S. pat-
ent covered the product ASA. Most interestingly, there was no Canadian
patent, so the infringer was importing aspirin made in Canada into the
United States.238 A patent on the process alone in the U.S. would not have
barred imports.23 9 Indeed, no attempt was made to prove how the aspirin
was made.240 One would expect that sustaining product claims on aspirin
would result in significant rent dissipation at the conception state with no
amelioration at the improvement stage in the U.S. as compared to Ger-
-many, the UK and Canada.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., Inc.241 is an example of a
pharmaceutical patent case that is virtually impossible to explain under
rent dissipation theory. Lilly owned patents on cephalexin, which is an oral
antibiotic commonly used as a substitute for penicillin. The court affirmed
the grant of a preliminary injunction, concluding that there was a "high
probability of success on the merits" that the patent would be sustained.2 42
The district court had found: "[T]he drug yielded the unexpected prop-
erty of being almost 100% absorbable in the bloodstream." 243 It is difficult
to conceive how this could be improved.
234 Id
235 Id at 28.
236 Id. at 35. See Farbenfabriken vormals Friedvich Bayer & Co. v. Chemische Fabrik Von
Heyden, 22 R.P.D. & T.M. 501 (1905) (holding that the patent on ASA was for a product rather
than a process for purification and was invalid as being anticipated by the prior art; but even if a
process, it was also anticipated).
237 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910), cert. denied 220 U.S. 622 (1911).
238 MM & PLUMMER, supra note 231, at 35-36.
239 This loophole has been closed somewhat by the enactment of 35 U.S.CA. § 271(g) ( West
Supp. 1995):
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells or uses
within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United
States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the
product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of
a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the non-
commercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this
titie for infringement on account of the importation or other use or sale of that prod-
uct. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be
considered to be so made after-
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.
Id.
240 Kuehmsted, 179 F. at 702 ("The appellant sells an article having an identical formula and
responding to the characteristics set forth in the claim-that being the sole proof of infringement
(appellant's process not being shown) . ... ").
241 630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).
242 1d. at 138.
243 Id at 122.
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Pharmaceutical companies rely heavily on the patent system.244 Patent
protection is needed to justify their huge investments in the development
of new drugs. For example, Lilly spent approximately $10 million in re-
search and development on cephalexin and another $1.8 million on its
clinical testing on humans, required by the FDA for approval.2 45 Thus,
many pharmaceutical inventions would be classed as patent-induced inven-
tions. Their being sustained is fully consistent with the reward and patent-
induced theories, while the rent dissipation theory would predict their in-
validity. One would thus expect high rent dissipation at the conception in
the competition to develop the next elegant pharmaceutical. Reward and
patent-induced theories justify this result because of the perceived benefits
to society over the costs of protecting such inventions. The prospect theory
would be explained on the ground of the need to have single coordination,
and Kitch is even willing to admit that certain "exceptional" pharmaceuti-
cal patents grant monopoly powers.2 46 On the other hand, race-to-invent
theory would be troubled by broad protection as retarding whatever im-
provements can be made.
If the important class of high-cost elegant inventions typified by phar-
maceutical inventions cannot be explained by the rent dissipation theory,
then what is left? The only category would seem to be the low-cost elegant
inventions, such as Morton, and the pendi/eraser cases. However, with re-
244 After reviewing various empirical studies over a thirty-year period of the value of patents to
innovators, Von Hippel concludes:
In sharp contrast to the situation pertaining in most other industries and the elec-
tronics field in particular, the patent grant often confers significant benefit to innova-
tors in the pharmaceutical field. My discussions with patent attorneys working for
pharmaceutical firms brought out two likely reasons for this situation. First, unusually
strong patents are obtainable in the chemical field, of which pharmaceuticals is a part.
Second, it is often difficult to invent around a pharmaceutical patent.
Pharmaceutical patents can be unusually strong because one may patent an actual
molecule found to have useful medical properties and its analogs. One need not make
each analog claimed but can simply refer to lists of recognized functional equivalents
for each component of the molecule at issue ....
Many pharmaceutical patents are difficult to invent around today because the
mechanisms by which pharmaceuticals achieve their medical effects are often not well
understood.
ERIC VON HiPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNoVATION 53 (1988). In particular, see C. T. TAYLOR & Z. A.
SILBESToN, THE ECONOMIC IMPAcT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (1973), for findings from survey data
from various industries that if the patent system were abolished, R & D expenditures would be
reduced by 64% by the pharmaceutical industry and 25% by the specialty chemical industries,
compared to 5% by the mechanical components industry and a negligible reduction by the elec-
trical industries. See also Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, 1987 BRooxiNGS PAPERS ECON. ACrivrTy 783, 793-98 (empirical study finding
greater reliance on patents in chemical-related industries); PHARMACEUTICAL PANEL, NATIONAL
RESEARCH CoUNCI., THE CoMP-IrrVE STATUS OF THE AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDuSTRY 9-14(1980) (study of the industry's competitive position since World War II and the issuance of the
patent on streptomycin in 1948 indicating the dependence of modem pharmaceutical firms on
patents to support the extensive research investment required).
245 Eli Lilly & Co., 630 F.2d at 124-25.
246 As Kitch noted:
These arguments do not mean that no patents confer monopoly power upon their own-
ers. Some of the drug patents, such as patents that achieved dramatic and unique re-
ductions in the cost and effectiveness of medical care-probably have conferred
monopolies upon their owners. But this analysis suggests that they are very exceptional
cases.
Kitch, Patents, supra note 99, at 39.
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spect to these low-cost, elegant inventions, patent-induced theory would
seem to explain them equally as well. Such inventions would have been
invented in any event, and granting a patent on them would be costly.247
The prospect theory, of course, would predict validity of elegant inven-
tions, whether high-cost or low-cost, which satisfy substantial novelty. The
race-to-invent theory would have difficulty with sustaining such patents if
they were granted a scope of protection that would retard
improvements.2 48
2. Utility
To satisfy completely the requirements of § 101, the invention as
claimed not only must fall within one of the statutory classes of invention,
but also must be "useful," i.e., possess "utility."249 In Brenner v. Manson,25O
the Supreme Court held that a process for making a steroid failed to meet
the § 101 utility requirement when the steroid was undergoing in vitro
screening as a possible tumor inhibiting agent in mice.2 51 The Court
concluded:
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Con-
gress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public
from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is
refined and developed to this point-where specific benefits exist in cur-
rently available form-there is insufficient justification for permitting an
applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.
25 2
The Court would appear to adopt a restrictive view of the reward theory,
concluding: "But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for
the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion."2 53 Rent dis-
sipation theory is said to be consistent with the result in Manson, because a
court must have some indication of commercial value "in order to balance
patent rent against avoided rent dissipation." 254 As a practical matter, it
should follow that commercial success should be more determinative of
247 This is the logic ofJudge Posner in Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345-
48 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (concurring and dissenting in part) that a quick release wrench was
obvious as a matter of law because of its simplicity, low-cost to invent and ready market. See supra
note 70 (discussing the Roberts case).
248 However, as elegant inventions are unimprovable by definition, it would seem the race-to-
invent theory would not be greatly troubled by providing protection to such inventions. The
question of whether a particular invention is to be classed as "elegant" in the sense of being
unimprovable, is, of course, not one that is easily answerable.
249 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (quoted supra note 22).
250 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
251 Id. at 531-32. Although not the basis for the court's rejection of the patent, the court
found that a homologue to the steroid had been found effective as such an agent.
252 Id. at 534-35.
253 Id at 536.
254 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 339; see also id. at 339-40. They cite Ex parte McKay,
200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1975), and ExparteDrulard, 223 U.S.P.Q. 364
(PTO Bd. Pat. Aph. & Int. 1983), as further examples of cases relating to the utility requirement
being explained by the rent dissipation theory. The rationale is that, because the commercial
value of these inventions was limited, the "signal" for improvement may be correspondingly low.
McKay involved a process for extracting oxygen from extraterranial materials, and Dnrdard in-
volved a portable lightning rod. With respect to McKay, Grady and Alexander state that the
Board upheld a claim for the process. In fact, the Board found all appealed claims to be unpat-
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utility than as an indication of nonobviousness. Nonetheless, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has limited the impact of Manson. In Cross
v. Iizuka,255 for example, the court found "practical utility," presumably on
a factual basis, when an in vitro "pharmacological activity" is shown even
though no specific use of the compound has been established. The hold-
ing in cases like Cross by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would
seem to undermine the rationale of rent dissipation theory. It would seem
highly difficult for a court to analyze the commercial value of a compound
only having "pharmacological activity," whose ultimate use, if any, is yet to
be determined.
The reward theory, in its narrow form, explains cases like Manson. No
reward should be granted unless society receives a quid pro quo of an in-
vention having commercial value. Reward theory will also conveniently ex-
plain cases like Cross by the expedient of construing a finding of
"pharmacological activity" asjustifying a reward. The demonstrated "activ-
ity" provides society with at least a starting point, but, for that matter, so did
the steroid in Manson.
Patent-induced theory has great difficulty with a strict utility require-
ment because it is posited that the important inventions are revolutionary
ones. Such inventions tend to be at the cutting edge of technology, with an
unestablished commercial value and market. The requirement of commer-
cial value may also be inconsistent with both race-to-invent and prospect
theories, for under these theories the invention should be disclosed as
quickly as possible so that the technology may be developed as expedi-
tiously as possible. Indeed, the prospect theory would seem to envision a
sort of "hunting license." On the other hand, race-to-invent theory may
have difficulty if broad scope of coverage is provided to a compound that
has merely displayed "pharmacological activity."
B. Conditions for Protection
1. Novelty
Section 102 is a relatively complex section of the Patent Act dealing
with a variety of issues.256 A basic issue is whether the invention satisfies the
entable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious. It would be consistent with all the theories,
except perhaps the prospect theory, to deny protection to obvious inventions.
255 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see Request for Comments on Proposed Utility Examina-
tion Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 97 (1994) (proposed Dec. 23, 1994), repfinted in 49 PAT. TRADMARK
& COPMRGHTJ. (BNA) 234 (1995).
256 Section 102 provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of
an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a
foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
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standard for protection of being novel. The novelty specified in paragraph
(a) of § 102 is not absolute novelty in the sense that knowledge or use of
the invention by another anywhere in the world would defeat novelty. The
standard employed in § 102 (a) is qualified novelty. The invention claimed
must not have been "known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country."2 57
Moreover, the knowledge or use must be "public."25 8 This doctrine ex-
plains the result in Gayler v. Wilder,259 where the prior, but secret, use of a
fireproof safe design was held by the Supreme Court not to defeat novelty
of a later claimant for the patent. Rent dissipation theory is said to explain
this result better because the secret use "could not have signaled the claim-
ant's invention."260 This conclusion cannot be assailed. Nonetheless, can
it be said that the publication of a complete description of the safe in an
obscure journal in an obscure foreign country and language would have
signaled the invention, thus denying novelty? Rent dissipation may be re-
duced by the grant of the patent when there has been no public disclosure
of the invention and, as yet, no opportunity for signaled improvements in
the patent to be made. However, it would seem that a system of qualified
novelty would encourage rent dissipation at the conception stage, as only
public use, knowledge or publication defeats novelty. In Gayler, the fire-
proof safe had been invented a number of years prior to the patent at issue.
It was then reinvented, at least once, with the consequence of rent dissipa-
tion.2 61 Moreover, the fickleness of knowledge or use in the United States
versus the requirement of a printed publication abroad are not easily ex-
plained by one signaling and the other not.
Another novelty problem not addressed by Grady and Alexander and
not easily explained by rent dissipation is the denial of novelty of an inven-
tion on the basis of an earlier co-pending application, which describes the
invention claimed in the later application. A leading example of this is
application for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the
filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or on an international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements
of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining prior-
ity of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception
and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who
was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by
the other.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
257 Id. § 102(a).
258 See CHISUM, supra note 179, § 3.05[2] [a] (discussing and collecting cases).
259 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850).
260 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 341.
261 Conner made the safe for his own use between 1829 and 1832. Gayer, 51 U.S. at 495. The
Fitzgerald patent in issue was not granted until June 1, 1843, based on an application filed April
11, 1839. Thus, during the entire period of secret knowledge or use, rent dissipation appears to
be encouraged rather than discouraged by a system of qualified novelty.
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Alexander Milbum Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co.,262 where Justice Holmes rea-
soned that, when the first applicant had taken steps to make the disclosure
public as soon as the Patent Office did its work, the later applicant should
not benefit from the delay.263 It can hardly be said that the earlier applica-
tion signaled the latter invention, when it was kept secret in the PTO as
required by statute.264 Thus, because of this secrecy, it cannot be said that
the race to improve has already taken place, justifying the denial of the
patent. The result is that the invention of the later application goes into
the public domain, initiating a race to improve contrary to rent dissipation
theory.
Novelty doctrine, as described above, would appear to be better ex-
plained by the reward theory. No reward should be provided for reinven-
tion, provided the public has received the potential benefit, at least, by the
public knowledge, use, or publication of the earlier invention or its disclo-
sure in a patent application. The race-to-invent theory would also support
the denial of the patent, if there is public use, knowledge, or publication,
because grant of the patent would interfere with competition in improve-
ments. The same could be said with respect to the prospect theory, which
justifies itself on the finding of "substantial novelty" to control the develop-
ment of the improvements.
The second basic issue in § 102 is that of an inventor's self-destruction
of novelty, i.e., statutory time bars. As provided in § 102(b), a patent will
be denied if "the invention was described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or sale in this country, more than one
year prior" to the U.S. filing date.26 5 The one year "period of grace" to file
the application is another qualification to absolute novelty.26 6 Most coun-
tries of the world do not provide such a period of grace. 267 Grady and
Alexander attempt to explain time bars as follows: "The best explanation
seems to be that the patent laws seek to avoid rent dissipation through
secrecy."268 A standard doctrinal rationale for this loss-of-right provision is
262 270 U.S. 390 (1926).
263 1I at 401; see also Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965) (extending
reasoning of Milburn to rejections based on § 103 with regard to co-pending applications).
264 In the present codification, see 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988) (confidential status of applications).
265 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (quoted supranote 256). As explained by the courtin TP Labo-
ratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 826 (1984) (footnote omitted):
More specifically, courts have discerned a number of factors which must be weighed in
applying the statutory bar of § 102(b). Operating against the inventor are the policies
of 1) protecting the public in its use of the invention where such use began prior to the
filing of the application, 2) encouraging prompt disclosure of new and useful informa-
tion, 3) discouraging attempts to extend the length of the period of protection by not
allowing the inventor to reap the benefits for more than one year prior to the filing of
the application. In contrast to these considerations, the public interest is also deemed
to be served by allowing an inventor time to perfect his invention, by public testing, if
desired, and prepare a patent application.
1d.
266 The grace period itself may be seen as contrary to the rent dissipation theory because
during this year rent may be dissipating by others trying to develop the same invention.
267 The rationale for the period of grace, which used to be two years, is to provide time for
inventors to prepare patent applications and have an opportunity to market their inventions as
soon as possible. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 179, § 6.02.
268 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 342.
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that inventors should not be permitted to exploit their inventions commer-
cially and only disclose them by means of the patent system when competi-
tion forces them to do so, hence extending their monopoly.2 69 This
rationale applies equally well to disclosing as well as nondisclosing commer-
cial uses of the invention, as made clear by Judge Learned Hand in Metal-
lizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co.2 70 Rent dissipation
theory may explain cases such as Metallizing. The incentive to file patent
applications early would tend to avoid rent dissipation resulting from keep-
ing the invention secret. On the other hand, it is not apparent why the
denial of the patent because of secret commercial use would not stimulate
a race to improve the invention once disclosed and hence dissipate rent.
The "on sale" bar in § 102(b) also is not easily explained by rent dis-
sipation theory.271 In such cases, there appears little rent dissipation by
inventors keeping the invention secret. These inventors typically are just a
bit too eager to market their inventions. Moreover, with the denial of the
patent because it was "on sale," rent dissipation will occur in the race to
improve, once the invention is disclosed publicly.
Moreover, the rent dissipation theory does not explain the "experi-
mental use" exception to the statutory bars.272 Under this exception, the
inventor may noncommercially use the invention beyond the grace period
to further develop it and still not be barred. However, rent may be dissi-
pated in keeping the details of such inventions secret, which would other-
wise be disclosed in a patent application, and rent may be dissipated in
improving whatever is disclosed to the public in the experimental stage.
The reward and patent-induced theories seem to explain statutory bars
better than the rent dissipation theory. The reward is offered to those in-
ventors who rely upon the patent system and hence disclose their inven-
tions in a timely manner to the public by means of the patent system.
These theories tend to minimize reliance on secrecy and avoid the exten-
sion of the monopoly by secret exploitation of the invention is avoided.
The patent-induced theory also tends to explain time bars. Most inven-
tions that run afoul of public use or on sale bars tend to be market-induced
inventions-inventors are overly anxious to get them to market. The pat-
ent-induced theory may particularly explain the experimental use excep-
269 The principal is of long lineage:
If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public the
secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and
make and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it, relying
upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure; and then, and then only, when
the danger of competition should force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be
allowed to take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use than what
should be derived under it during his fourteen years; it would materially retard the
progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least
prompt to communicate their discoveries.
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1827).
270 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946) (invalidation of process patent
filed more than one-year from the sale of products made by the process).
271 See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 179, § 6.02[6] (discussing and collecting cases on the "on
sale" statutory bar).
272 See generally id. § 6.02[7] (discussing and collecting cases on the experimental use excep-
tion to § 102(b) statutory bars).
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tion with respect to inventions that have not been fully developed and that
require further experimentation prior to the inventor's capability to
demonstrate their operability, let alone their marketability.
The race-to-invent theory would seemingly oppose a system of quali-
fied novelty. However, it may explain a grace period, as this allows inven-
tors to commercialize their inventions for a year without losing their patent
rights. The "substantial novelty" required for patentability under the pros-
pect theory presumably would explain either an absolute or a qualified sys-
tem of novelty. The grace period would present a problem of worldwide
coordination because most countries do not permit commercialization
prior to filing for a patent.
The third major issue in § 102 is who should receive the patent when
there are two or more applicants for the same invention.273 Unlike the rest
of the world, the United States employs a "first inventor" system rather
than a "first-to-file" system. 274 Whenever there are multiple inventors,
there are costs (rent dissipation) under either a first inventor or first-to-file
system; nonetheless, the first-to-file system would tend to dissipate less rent.
The first-to-file system encourages filing the application at an early stage of
development and having the patent issued at an early stage. This would
tend to minimize rent dissipation because the question of which applicant
filed first is mechanically resolved and who first conceived the invention is
irrelevant. In the United States, if two or more applicants can claim the
same invention, an "interference" may be declared to resolve the issue of
priority of invention.2 75 This complicated, costly, and time-consuming inter
partes procedure before the PTO delays the issuance of the patent, result-
ing in further rent dissipation. 27 6 Moreover, under the statute, the first
inventor is not necessarily the one who first actually or constructively
reduces the invention to practice; rather the first inventor may be the first
to conceive yet last to reduce to practice, provided there is reasonable dili-
273 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988) (quoted .supra note 256).
274 In a "first-to-file" system, the issue of who is entitled to the patent is resolved mechanically
on the basis of who wins the race to the Patent Office, and pre-filing activity is irrelevant. Under
the "first inventor" system in the United States, such pre-filing activity may be highly relevant and
indeed determinative of who receives the patent. In the United States:
The general rule as to priority of invention is that priority goes to the inventor who first
reduced an embodiment of the invention to practice. This rule is subject to two excep-
tions. The inventor who was the first to conceive the subject matter but the last to
reduce to practice will prevail if he exercised reasonable diligence in reducing to prac-
tice from a timenjust prior to when the first person to reduce to practice conceived the
subject matter. Further, the second to reduce to practice will prevail if the first aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed the invention.
3 CHISUM, supra note 179, § 10.01, at 10-4.
275 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1988) provides:
(a) Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the Commis-
sioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, an
interference may be declared and the Commissioner shall give notice of such declara-
tion to the applicants, or applicant and patentee, as the case may be....
(b) A claim which is the same as, or for the same or substantially the same subject
matter as, a claim of an issued patent may not be made in any application unless such a
claim is made prior to one year from the date on which the patent was granted.
Id.
276 Rent may be dissipated by the interference parties but also by others working on the same
or related inventions.
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gence on the part of that inventor from a time prior to the conception of
the other inventor.2 77 This would tend to promote rent dissipation at the
conception stage, because early conception, rather than early filing, is
rewarded.
The race-to-invent theory would appear to support a first-to-file system
because of the greater likelihood of early disclosure of the invention and
the opportunity for improvement. The same may be said of the prospect
theory. If the mineral claim system is to be the model, the first to file the
claim receives the grant. On the contrary, reward theory would tend to
support the first-inventor system on a justice-based rationale that the re-
ward should be granted to that individual who first provides the conceptual
basis for the invention and then proceeds diligently to develop it. The pat-
ent-induced theory, incorporating the reward theory, would also seem to
support the first inventor system, unless it could be maintained that it is
more likely that the first inventor to file is more likely to be relying on the
patent system.
The long pendency period of many patents also may result in rent
dissipation, not only at the conception stage but also at the improvement
stage. So-called "submarine" patents present a significant problem in many
industries.2 78 The U.S. patent system, which does not publish the patent
disclosures until granted, would thus seem to be inherently rent dissipating
and hence contrary to rent dissipation theory.
In summary, rent dissipation theory has a great deal of difficulty in
explaining § 102 of the Patent Act. A qualified system of novelty would
appear to increase rent dissipation at the conception stage. Statutory time
bars tend to be explained if rent dissipation by secrecy is minimized; how-
ever, liberal application of the "on sale" bar and the experimental use ex-
ception are not explained. Moreover, rent dissipation theory fails to
explain a patent system that does not require publication at an early date
and does not award the patent to the first to file. Both of these result in
rent dissipation of all three varieties-conception, improvement and se-
crecy. Rent dissipation theory, however, would seem to have considerable
value as an analytical tool for weeding out inefficiencies in the present U.S.
patent system. This theory would support the elimination of the one-year
period of grace, the early publication of applications, and a first-to-file sys-
277 See35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988) (quoted supra note 256). In Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270
(Fed. Cir. 1985), an applicant who actually reduced the invention to practice four years prior to
filing, was permitted to rely upon its renewed activity from a date antedating the entry into the
field by the opposing party, who was first to file an application on the same invention.
278 They are also sometimes called "time-bomb" or "shark" patents. An interesting historical
example of this is the Selden patent covering the combination of an automobile, where the in-
ventor, who happened to be a patent attorney, was able to keep the patent pending before the
Patent Office for 16 years. This strategy failed. See Columbia Motor Car Co. v. CA Duerr & Co.,
184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911); supra text accompanying notes 255-60. A recent example is the Hyatt
patent (4,942516, issuedJuly 17, 1990, based on an application filed Nov. 24, 1969) covering the
invention of the microprocessor, which is said by the patentee, Gilbert Hyatt, to have spawned
today's multibillion-dollar computer chip industry. Hyatt, who happens to be a patent agent in
addition to an inventor, has successfully licensed his invention patent to various manufacturers,
including North American Philips Corporation, Sony Corporation and Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Company, anticipating royalty revenues in the order of $100 million. SeeJohn Carey, Inching
Toward A Borderless Patent, Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1994, at 35; Ex-Wife Sues for Micro Millions, DAILY MAIL,
June 2, 1993, at 10.
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tem. All of these are under consideration as part of a Patent Law Harmoni-
zation Treaty and part of the implementation of the Trade Related
Intellectual Property provisions negotiated in relation to the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.2 79 Bills have been introduced in Con-
gress to require publication of patent applications280 and to change the
term of a patent from 17 years from the grant date to 20 years from the
filing date which would induce applicants to seek early grant of their
patents.281
2. Nonobviousness
Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, those inventions that constituted statu-
tory subject matter and that possessed utility and novelty still had to satisfy
an implied standard of "invention."282 The issue of "invention" often was
resolved under negative rules of invention 283 or under doctrinal glosses,
including the skill of the "ordinary mechanic" 284 or even the "flash of crea-
tive genius."285 Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act set out the standard of
invention in terms of "nonobviousness,"-a patent will not be granted if
the claimed invention "would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains."286 The Supreme Court did not construe this section until
279 See DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A TPtnRr SUPPLEMENTING THE PARS
CONVENTION As FAR As PATENTS ARE CONCERNED, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
THE HAGUE, June 3-28, 1991; THE "BASIC PROPOSAI" FOR THE TREATY AND THE REGULATIONS,
WORLD INTELLECUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/3 (1990); NOTES ON
THE BASIC PROPOSAL FOR THE TREATY AND REGULATIONS, WORLD INTELLcrTUAL PROPERTY ORGANI-
ZATION, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/4 (1990); HISTORY OF THE PREPARATIONS OF THE PATENT LAW
TREATY, WORLD INTELLECIAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5 (1990). The
treaty would require member-states to have a "first-to-file" system (Art. 9) and to publish applica-
tions (ArL 15); however, it would also require the provision of a "grace period." (Art. 12). Com-
merce Secretary Ron Brown announced in January 1994 that a "first-to-file" system would not be
adopted in the United States. See U.S. Says "Not Now" on First-to-File and Agrees with Japan on Patent
Term, 47 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPRIGHTJ. (BNA) 285 (1994). The change from a 17 year term
from grant to a 20 year term from filing date and the publication of applications is far from
assured. See U.S.-Japan Conclude Agreement on Reexamination and Publication, 48 PAT. COPYRIGHT &
TRAnEMARKJ. (BNA), 412-13 (1994); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, sec. 531-34, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (20 years from filing date with exceptions, one year grace
period; however, no publication requirement or "first-to-file" system); infra notes 280 and 281
(difference in Senate and House bills). Whatever political compromise is ultimately reached may
well support Judge Posner's conclusion that legislative rules "tend to be efficiency reducing."
POSNER ECONOMIC ANALSIS, supra note 14, at 523.
280 S. 1854, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (Publication 18 months after filing).
281 H.R. 4505, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (no publication required).
282 See generally NONOBVIOUSNEss-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILrY (J. Wither-
spoon ed., 1980) (compiling numerous articles concerning § 103). See Giles S. Rich, The Vague
Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Section 103 of the Patent Act, id. at 1:401 (discussing events
leading to judicial imposition of invention requirement); Herbert H. Mintz & C. Larry O'Rourke,
The Patentability Standard in Historical Perspective: "Invention" to Section 103 Nonobviousness, id. at
2:201 (tracing historical development of invention requirement).
283 See Anthony W. Deller, The Problem of Invention in the Law of Patents, 28 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y
797, 802 (1946) (listing 14 negative tests of patentability, including substitution of materials, 're-
versal of parts, change of location, size, degree and form, and aggregation of parts).
284 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850).
285 Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (stating that a
new device cannot be patented, regardless of usefulness, if it does not demonstrate a flash of
creative brilliance).
286 In its entirety, § 103 states:
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1965 and then did so in the context of three cases commonly called the
"trilogy."287 In Graham v. John Deere Co.,2 88 exhibiting a bit of revisionist
history, the Court stated: "The standard has remained invariable in this
Court".2 8 9 It found the language of § 103 "strongly reminiscent"290 of that
in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, decided in 1851, which required for invention
that there be "more ingenuity and skill... than were possessed by an ordi-
nary mechanic acquainted with the business."291 The test to determine
nonobviousness is expressly set out by the Court: "Under § 103, the scope
and the content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between
the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved."2 92 In applying this test to the
Graham '798 patent, the Court found it obvious to reverse the position of
the shaft of a plow from above to below the hinge plate.2 93 The principal
reference against the '798 was another patent previously issued to Gra-
ham-the '811 patent-which showed the shaft above the hingeplate.294
The rent dissipation theory is said to provide a more plausible expla-
nation of Graham and other nonobviousness cases. 295 This is accomplished
by categorizing the '798 plow as being an elegant invention because there
were only two variations possible; thus, the '798 configuration was unim-
provable and a patent was unnecessary to avoid rent dissipation.2 96 Catego-
rizing the '798 patent as elegant is rather curious in itself, in view of the
historical background of these two patents. It would appear that the '798
patent was a defensive patent filed by Graham to preclude competition
from using this particular design. Graham did not manufacture the '798
design but continued to employ the '811 design. 297 In 1953, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Jeoffroy Manufacturing v. Graham,298 held the '811 patent valid and
infringed. Jeoffroy changed its design during the course of this litigation
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or de-
scribed as set forth in section 102 of this tide, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made. Subject matter developed by
another person, which qualifies as prior art only under subsection (f) or (g) of section
102 of this tide, shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject
matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by
the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
287 Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966); Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., 383
U.S. 1, 26 (1966); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). All three cases were decided the
same day. Calmar and Adams appear under the caption Graham v. John Deere Co.
288 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
289 Id at 19.
290 Id. at 14.
291 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 267.
292 383 U.S. at 17.
293 Id. at 25-26.
294 The '811 patent (2,493,811) was filed February 26, 1947 and issuedJanuary 10, 1980. The
'798 patent (2,627,798) was filed August 27, 1951 and issued February 10, 1953.
295 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 342-47.
296 Id at 345.
297 As of 1964, Graham continued to manufacture plows according to the '811 design. See
John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1964), affd, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
298 206 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 920 (1954).
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and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of nonin-
fringement of the '811 patent. Graham counterclaimed for infringement
of both the '811 patent and the subsequently issued '798 patent. The dis-
trict court held the '811 patent to be infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents and held the '798 patent invalid.299 In 1955, the Fifth Circuit
reversed, refusing to apply such a broad interpretation of the doctrine of
equivalents, thus holding '811 not infringed, but holding the '798 valid and
infringed.300 Since the Fifth Circuit narrowly construed the '811 patent as
not covering a plow shank on the outside of the hinge plate according to
the '798 design, the competitors could avoid the '811 patent. Thus, the
'798 patent became the more important patent for Graham. However, in
1964, the Eighth Circuit's decision in John Deere v. Graham,30 1 which the
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed, held the '798 patent invalid.30 2
The reliance upon the '811 patent as a principal reference against the
'798 patent, and the narrow reading of the '811 patent by the Fifth Circuit,
draws into question the rent dissipation theory. If the '798 patent was inva-
lid over the '811 patent, then it would seem to follow that the '811 patent
must have signaled the '798 configuration. If the '798 configuration was
elegant, it is not apparent why the '811 configuration also was not. If the
'811 patent signaled the '798 configuration, this would result in rent dis-
sipation in not interpreting the '811 patent broad enough to cover the
obvious '798 alternative. Rent dissipation theory would suggest that the
'811 patent should have been interpreted broadly enough to read on the
'798 design and, hence, minimize rents that were dissipated by competitors
trying to avoid the '811 patent.
In an attempt to discredit the nonobviousness standard and to ad-
vance their own, Grady and Alexander go so far to assert that inventions
such as the pencil/eraser and Post-It Notes, said to have "revolutionized
their field," were nonobvious, and to suggest otherwise would be "nonsensi-
cal."303 If comparing the claimed invention with the prior art in the light
of the requisite skill in that art is "nonsensical," is it "sensical" to categorize
an invention as being elegant when its inventor preferred the original de-
sign ('811), which competitors attempted to design around, resulting in
the invalidation of the alternative design (the defensive '798 patent)?
Would the '798 patent have been held invalid in the absence of the '811
patent, and would the '811 patent have been sustained if Graham had pat-
ented the '798 configuration first? Rent dissipation theory does not seem
to provide answers to these questions.
299 Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511,512 n.2 (5th Cir.) (the district court's opinion
appears in note 2 of the case as set forth in two letters to the parties' counsel), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 826 (1955).
300 Id. at 516-20.
301 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
302 Id. John Deere, like Jeoffroy, tried to avoid infringement of the '811 and '798 patents by
designing around them. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 216 F. Supp. 272, 277 (W.D. Mo. 1963),
rev'd, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964), affd, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). In addition to the litigation costs,
considerable rent dissipation must have occurred in attempting to design around the Graham
patents.
303 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 344.
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Moreover, it would appear that the best explanation for Graham is
found under the patent-induced theory, which is expressly adopted by the
Supreme Court: "The inherent problem was to develop some means of
weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but
for the inducement of a patent."304 Thus, inventions that are obvious, such
as the '798 modification of the '811 design, do not need the patent system
to be created. 30 5 A fortiori simple, cheap, and highly marketable inven-
tions, such as the pencil/eraser and Post-It Notes, are likely to be conceived
and commercialized irrespective of the patent system, and without signifi-
cant delay.
The race-to-invent theory could also nicely predict the invalidation of
the '798 patent as permitting the free competition in improvements over
the '811 patent; moreover, the narrow construction of the claims in the
'811 patent would be consistent with this theory. The prospect theory
would seem to predict broad interpretation of claims of the '811 patent as
covering the '798 configuration or sustain the validity of the '798 patent.
The second case in the "trilogy" is not mentioned by Grady and Alex-
ander, perhaps with some reason. The Supreme Court, in Calmar, Inc. v.
Cook Chemical Co.,30 6 invalidated a patent covering a closure mechanism for
a pump-sprayer bottle which prevented leakage during shipping. The
Court compared the claims to the prior art and concluded that this mecha-
nism would have been obvious to a person skilled in the sealer art.30 7 The
invention was commercially successful and resolved a long-felt need in this
industry.30 8 Presumably, rent dissipation theory would justify this decision
on the basis that the invention was elegant and did not signal any improve-
ments. However, the claimed closure invention had been improved be-
cause both the accused infringer and the patent owner modified the
original design to use a simpler rib and groove closure.30 9
The reward and patent-induced theories can explain the result in Cal-
mar. The inventor deserved no reward for the obvious solution. The inven-
tion would appear to be a market-induced rather than a patent-induced
invention. There was a long-felt need, and the commercial success of the
invention demonstrated its marketability. It is likely that it would have
been invented irrespective of the patent system, for it was a low-cost solu-
tion to a troubling problem.
The race-to-invent theory would also explain the result in Calmar, in
particular with respect to both ignoring the commercial success of the
product, and focusing on the quality of the invention itself. The prospect
theory would reach the contrary result, provided there was "substantial nov-
304 Graham, 383 U.S. at 11.
305 There is some irony here because the '798 was patent-induced in the subjective sense.
Graham obviously was relying upon the patent system in creating the alternative design and filing
for a defensive patent to block competitors who would attempt to design around Graham's '811
plow.
306 383 U.S. 1, 26 (1966).
307 Id- at 32-37.
308 Id- at 35-36.
309 Id at 31-32. This feature was disclosed in an analogous prior act but it still demonstrated
that the original design could be improved. Was it too valuable compared to the signaled
improvements?
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elty" in the claimed device. Also, it might be noted that the market for
closure devices would be a highly competitive one and the type of flat de-
mand curve situation that Kitch predicts with respect to patents.
In the third case in the "trilogy," United States v. Adams,310 the Supreme
Court upheld a patent claiming a battery activated by water. The rent dis-
sipation theory would distinguish this case from Graham on the basis that
the Adams' patent signaled improvements.3 1' Doctrine would explain the
case in that Adams' invention was found nonobvious because the prior art
taught away from a water activated battery. The remaining theories would
also seem to support the validity of this patent.
Adams deserved the reward, as he took a contrarian view of what
would work to provide a valuable invention. The patent would appear to
be a patent-induced one. Adams was an independent inventor who took
the risk of challenging conventional wisdom and devising a battery that
would work with water.312 The prospect theory would justify the validity on
the basis that Adams should be the one to coordinate the development of
this particular technical prospect. The race-to-invent theory also would sus-
tain the patent, provided that the scope of protection was not so broad as
to preclude the competition in improvements.
C. Scope Of Protection
As presented above, the respective economic theories have various de-
grees of difficulty in explaining whether a particular patent in a particular
case would be held valid or invalid. Whenever a theory correctly predicts
the validity of a patent, this does not end the case. The second critical issue
is whether the patent found valid has been infringed. Thus, if the eco-
nomic theory that correctly predicts the validity of the patent is to have full
predictive value, it should also predict whether the patent is infringed. In-
310 383 U.S. 1, 39 (1966).
311 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 346. General Mills, Inc. v. Pillsbury Company, 378 F.2d
666 (8th Cir. 1967), is the final case cited by Grady and Alexander to show that the rent dissipa-
tion theory better explains nonobvious decisions than does the doctrine itself. The invention was
for a one-step angel food cake mix. Rent dissipation theory would not sustain this patent because
the use of optimum proportions could not be improved. Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at
346. The court concluded that Pillsbury's "contribution lies in determining the proper amount
and proportion of acid and soda to be added to a batter to create a successful cake by a one stage
mix." General Mills, 378 F.2d at 670. This combination of known ingredients was held unpatent-
able because it was obvious. Id. at 669-71. The reward and patent-induced theory would also
support this result. It would appear that since one-step mixes were so valuable the market itself
would induce their creation irrespective of the patent system. The prospect theory would be to
the contrary in this highly competitive market. The race-to-invent theory would predict invalidity
on technical merit, even in the light of the commercial success of the one-step mix.
312 Bert Adams conducted his experiments trying to perfect a water-activated battery in the
kitchen of his apartment. One night while experimenting, ashes from his cigarette fell into cu-
prous oxide while being melted on the kitchen stove. He continued the experiment and used
the mixture in his battery. The result was his invention with a sufficient current output being
generated to light a small bulb at substantially constant voltage. He concluded that it was the
carbon content in the cigarette ash acting as a catalyst that resulted in the increased current. He
then experimented with other forms of carbon. The travails of Adams in making his invention
and trying to obtain compensation from the government are told in RICHARD L. GAusEwrrz, PAT-
ENT PENDING: TODAY'S INVENTORS AND THEIR INvENTIONS 54-64 (1983).
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fringement is defined in § 271 of the Patent Act and requires that the ac-
cused infringer "make, use or sell" the claimed invention.3 13
1. Literal Infringement
For literal infringement, a claim of the patent must be read element by
element on the accused subject matter. Literal infringement has generally
been narrowly construed starting with Prouty v. Ruggles,3 1 4 and reaffirmed
in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.315 Deepsouth held that packaging all
the parts of a patented machine in the United States with instructions on
how to assemble did not constitute infringement when the machine was
assembled and used outside of the country. However, Deepsouth has been
legislatively reversed.3 16 Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has adopted a much more liberal construction of infringement. In
Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.,317 the court held that
it was infringement to "make" by partially assembling a patented machine,
to "use" it by testing subassemblies, and to "sell" it in less than fully assem-
bled form. The case was decided before the legislative reversal of Deepsouth,
the court distinguishing Deepsouth by limiting it to export situations.318
Reward theory would support a scope of protection commensurate
with the contribution made by the inventor. Thus, the narrow construc-
tion in Deepsouth of what constitutes a "making" may be inconsistent with
reward theory, and the legislative reversal would rectify this. Also, the flexi-
bility introduced by Paper Converting may be seen as explained by the re-
313 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995) ("Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within
the United States or imports into the United States any patent invention during the term of the
patent thereof, infringes the patent.").
314 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336 (1842). As the court stated:
And this combination, composed of all the parts mentioned in the specification, and
arranged with reference to each other, and to other parts of the plough in the manner
therein described, is stated to be the improvement, and is the thing patented. The use
of any two of these parts only, or of two combined with a third, which is substantially
different in form in the manner of its arrangement and connection with the others; is
therefore not the thing patented. It is not the same combination if it substantially dif-
fers from it in any of its parts.
Id. at 341.
315 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
316 See 35 U.S.CA § 271(f) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995):
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United
States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States,
shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United
States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in
whole or in part, knowing that such component will be combined outside of the United
States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within
the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
Id.
317 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
318 Id. at 17-19.
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ward theory, thus enabling courts to fashion an appropriate scope of
protection in line with the contribution made by the inventors. On the
other hand, rent dissipation theory may have difficulty in explaining cases
such as Paper Converting because, with an indefinite scope of protection,
rent dissipation would seem to be increased at the improvement stage. If
competitors are uncertain as to the scope of a patent, they may expend
additional sums in an attempt to avoid the patent or pay royalties for com-
mercialization beyond the scope signaled by the patent. Race-to-invent the-
ory would be troubled by Paper Converting because the indefinite scope of
the protection may act as a disincentive to competitors to risk improve-
ments. Prospect theory would seem to explain the reversal of Deepsouth and
the holding in Paper Converting to assure broad coordinating power to the
patent owner.
Expanding the scope of protection may, in addition, have adverse con-
sequences by increasing the incentive at the conception stage. Grady and
Alexander cite The Incandescent Lamp Patent case,31 9 Columbia Motor Car Co.
v. C.A. Duerr & Co., 3 20 Wyeth v. Stone,321 and Texas Instruments Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'rn22 as examples of cases where the scope of protec-
tion claimed was considerably broader than the specific embodiments of
the invention disclosed in the patent. While the claims of such patents
literally read on accused subject matter, infringement was not found by the
courts. This is the so-called "reverse doctrine of equivalents," limiting the
claims to equivalents of what is actually disclosed in the patent.3 23 Rent
dissipation is said to explain this result because such broad protection
would provide an added incentive at the conception stage and hence cause
rent dissipation in attempting to secure the monopoly.3 24 Grady and Alex-
ander are correct that providing overly broad protection may provide too
great an incentive at the conception stage, resulting in rent dissipation.
However, they appear to have it wrong in their dismissive attitude of the
value of knowing the state of the art: "Clever noninventors would pore
over scientific and trade literature, ready to race to the Patent Office with
claims broadly descriptive of a current set of signals."325 The failure to pour
319 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
320 184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911).
321 S0 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107).
322 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
323 Boyden Power-Burke Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1897) ("We have repeatedly
held that a charge of infringement is sometimes made out, though the letter of the claims be
avoided.... The converse is equally true."); see 1 CHiSUM, supra note 179, § 18.04[4]; see also
Merges & Nelson, supra note 13, at 853-68 (economic rationale for doctrine).
324 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 318-20, 328-29, 348.
325 Id. at 320 (emphasis added). It would seem that society may well owe a debt of gratitude
to "clever" individuals pouring over the prior art, such as Felix Hoffman, who is said to have
found aspirin more in the library, than in the laboratory. See supra text accompanying note 233.
Rather cryptically Grady and Alexander state: "If races among actual inventors are bad, pre-
sumably races among lawyers - from a rent dissipation point of view - would be worse." Grady
& Alexander, supra note 7, at 320. Does this mean that patent or other lawyers cannot be "actual"
inventors without, at least, going into the garage and dirtying their hands? As a matter of fact,
Patent Attorney Selden evidently did get his hands dirty. He made improvements in the Brayton
engine, as stated by the court in Columbia Motor Car "To make these improvements we think that
something more than mere mechanical skill was required, and, in view of the superior efficiency
of the engine for the purpose for which it was designed, we hold that invention was involved."
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over scientific and trade literature as well as the patent literature by inven-
tors and noninventors alike would seem to be highly conducive to rent
dissipation. "Reinventing the wheel" is a prime source of rent dissipation
at both the conception and improvement stages as well as dissipating rent
in keeping "secret" what is already in the public domain. 326
These cases, admittedly, are consistent with the reward theory, for in-
ventors should not be rewarded for something not invented.327 At least the
Columbia Motor Car case would seem inconsistent with the patent-induced
theory, because the inventor, George Selden, was a patent attorney, and
obviously he was relying upon the patent system.3 2 8 However, as the pat-
ent-induced theory depends upon the reward theory, it would be consistent
in the sense that, even if an invention is subsequently patent-induced, in-
ventors should not be rewarded beyond their contribution to the art.
The race-to-invent theory would support the result in such cases of
overly broad claiming, beyond what is taught by the inventor. The pros-
pect theory, however, would be inconsistent with these cases because broad
coordinating should be granted to the inventor.3 29
2. Doctrine of Equivalents
Under the doctrine of equivalents, 330 infringement may be held, even
though the claim cannot literally be read on the accused subject matter
when it "performs substantially the same function, in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result."331 In the leading case, Graver Tank & Mfg.
Columbia Motor Car, 184 F. at 907. Unfortunately for Selden it was the Otto engine that was
improved and adopted by the industry. See iaL at 910-11, 916.
326 One may be reminded of the admonition of the Supreme Court in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook
Chemical Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966): "It is also irrelevant that no one apparently chose to avail
himself of knowledge stored in the Patent Office and readily available by the simple expedient of
conducting a patent search-a prudent and nowadays common preliminary to well organized
research."
327 See Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 320 n.58.
328 Selden practiced in Rochester, N.Y., and was the first patent attorney retained by George
Eastman, prosecuting Eastman's original patent on a process for coating dry plates. See WILLIAM
GREENLEAF, MONOPOLY ON WHEELS: HENRY FORD AND THE SELDEN PATENT SUIT 8 (1961). Green-
leaf provides a detailed history of the Selden patent controversy. Brief histories are found in
JAMES J. FUNK, AMERICA ADOPTS THE AUTOMOBILE, 1895-1910, at 318-31 (1970); JOHN B. RAE,
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURES: THE FIRST FORTY YEARs 72-81 (1959). Prior to being
granted the patent on the motor car, Selden had been granted patents on other inventions,
including a device for attaching rubber tires to wheels, apparatus for manufacturing barrel hoops
and a typewriter. GREENLEAF, pra, at 9.
329 A rather perverse example of coordinating power was that attempted under the Selden
patent. In 1899, Selden assigned his rights in the patent to the Electric Vehicle Co. for $10,000
and 20% of royalties derived from the patent. The Electric Co. was evidently hedging its bets that
the electric automobile cars might lose out to gasoline powered ones. Rights to the Selden pat-
ent then were acquired by the Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers (ALAM),
which was a trade organization formed to license the Selden patent in an attempt to regulate
entry into the gasoline-powered automobile market. This attempted coordination proved largely
unsuccessful. See FLINK, supra note 328, at 318-22. The ALAM had restrictive membership poli-
cies and, in a curious twist of fate, Selden himself having assigned his patent away, had to acquire
a license under his own patent. He did this by acquiring a licensed manufacturer. See GREENLEAF,
supra note 328, at 172-75.
330 See generally 1 CHisUM, supra note 179, § 18.04.
331 Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigera-
tor Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1877))).
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Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 332 the Supreme Court held that manganese was
the equivalent of the claimed "alkaline earth metal" (magnesium), even
though manganese is not an alkaline earth metal. Accordingly, an overly
expansive reading of claims under the doctrine of equivalents, extending
the patent to cover a wide scope of alternatives, may cause rent dissipation
at the conception stage. This would have to be balanced against the dimi-
nution of rent dissipation at the improvement stage because of the doc-
trine. Nonetheless, uncertainty is introduced because of the inherent
ambiguity of the scope of protection afforded under the doctrine. This
inherent ambiguity is illustrated in Grady and Alexander's analysis of
Graver Tank. Rather than talking in terms of equivalents, they state, "One
could just as easily say the patentee's invention signaled the manganese vari-
ation."333 While respondent's patent did disclose the use of manganese,
such usage was already taught in the prior art.-s4 Is the patentee to be
given credit for re-signaling the state of the art?
Recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on
the doctrine of equivalents have further muddied the waters.33 5 It is far
from apparent that rent dissipation theory will rationalize these cases, espe-
cially if courts are expected to determine what is signaled and what is not
signaled without further elaboration.
3. Contributory Infringement
Infringement can also be categorized into direct and indirect infringe-
ment. Direct infringement occurs when a given defendant either makes,
uses or sells the patented invention in violation of § 271 (a). Indirect in-
fringement may be subdivided into induced and contributory infringe-
ment. Under § 271(b), induced infringement occurs when one causes
another to directly infringe a patent by active inducement 33 6 Contributory
infringement occurs under § 271 (c) when one sells an element for use in
an invention when that element has no substantial noninfringing use (i.e.,
is "not a staple element of commence").337 The sine qua non of induced
332 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
333 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 348 (emphasis added).
334 Id; see Craver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610-11.
335 See 4 CHiSUM, supra note 179, § 18.04[1]; see also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,
883 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009
(1988) (adopting an "all elements" analysis but compare the various views of the judges on the
doctrine). The Pennwalt decision has generated a plethora of recent commentary. CompareAdas
Powder Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (relevance of
"heart of the invention" to equivalents analysis) with Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1531 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (not infringement under doctrine of equivalents
if achieves the result in a substantially different way).
336 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1988) provides, "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent
shall be liable as an infringer."
337 Section 271(c) states:
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or com-
position, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting
a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commod-
ity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contribu-
tory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1988).
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and contributory infringement is direct infringement. This was the prob-
lem in Deepsouth.338 There was no direct infringement in the United States
of the U.S. patent; thus the defendant could not be held to have induced
or contributed to its infringement.
The scope of protection afforded under a given patent may be aug-
mented, depending upon how indirect infringement principles are applied
in actual cases. An interesting case for the application of economic theo-
ries is Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm& Haas Co.339 Dawson Chemical involved
the interface of contributory infringement, under § 271 (c) with the patent
misuse doctrine, under § 271 (d).340 The Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant contributorily infringed plaintiff's patent on a process for applying
propanil as an herbicide in rice fields. Propanil was an unpatented com-
pound that had no other use but that specified in the patented process.
Defendant, by selling propanil with instructions on how to apply according
to the patented method, was contributing to the infringement of the pat-
ent, and the farmers who actually applied the propanil were direct infring-
ers.34 1 The Court held that there was no misuse in the patentee's refusal to
license the defendant to sell propanil for use in its only known
application. 342
The result in Dawson Chemical is consistent with the reward theory.
The inventor had contributed a valuable process to the public by employ-
ing a previously useless compound. It is not apparent whether the inven-
tion was patent-induced. However, a case can be made that it was, because
there was considerable interest in propanil, and it is unlikely that contin-
ued experimentation would have occurred unless patent protection could
be obtained on an invention that could so easily be infringed upon. Ratio-
nalizing the Dawson Chemical case with rent dissipation theory is not so easy.
In the first place, there was considerable rent dissipation in the attempt to
acquire the patent over propanil.4 3 Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, the invention was elegant for it is not apparent what improvements
could be signaled. All the invention entailed was the discovery that
338 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972).
339 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
340 Section 271(d) now states the following:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringe-
ment of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of
the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following. (1) derived
revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement
of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contribu-
tory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) condi-
tioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988). At the time of Dawson Chem., only subparagraphs (1), (2) and (3)
were specifically excluded from being classified as misuse. Subparagraphs (4) and (5) were ad-
ded by the Patent and Trademark Authorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988)).
341 Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 183.
342 Id. at 202.
343 See supra note 227.
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propanil would work as an herbicide when mixed with water and applied to
rice fields. Thus, it is difficult to perceive how rent dissipation theory
would explain Dawson Chemical consistently with cases such as Morton4 and
the pencil/erasea45 cases. Also, granting protection to previously known
compounds, whether having other uses or a "first" use, such as propanil,
would seemingly cause rent dissipation at the conception stage, because
there would be a great race to develop such new-use inventions-that sig-
naled little, if any, means for technological improvement.
The result in Dawson -Chemical would be consistent with prospect the-
ory enabling the patent owner to coordinate the development of this par-
ticular herbicide, by exploitation itself or by licensing, which it refused to
do. The race-to-invent theory may be troubled by the Dawson Chemical deci-
sion, because of the broad scope of protection afforded under the patent.
The protection granted to the first use of propanil is tantamount to grant-
ing a monopoly over the compound itself.
If any generalizations can be made concerning the predictability of
infringement according to the economic theme of theories, they are not
readily discernible. All the theories, except the prospect theory, support
limiting the scope of claims to the contribution made by the invention dis-
closed. The reward, patent-induced, and prospect theories better explain a
broad interpretation of literal infringement than do the rent dissipation
and race-to-invent theories. The same may be said in respect to the nonlit-
eral infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and indirect infringe-
ment (induced and contributory). The'problem with the rent dissipation
theory, in particular, is that a broad scope of protection may induce rent
dissipation at the conception stage and retard it at the improvement stage.
On the other hand, a narrow scope will retard rent dissipation at the con-
ception stage but induce it at the improvement stage. Moreover, narrow
protection may induce dissipation by increased expenditures to maintain
secrecy. It is not at all apparent how rent dissipation predicts a scope that
optimizes the efficient allocation of resources.
D. A Word on "Signals"
Of singular importance to the rent dissipation theory is the word "sig-
nal." Whether improvements are signaled determines whether the patent
will be sustained and the content of those signals is determinative of the
scope of protection.346 As stated by Grady and Alexander: "A patentable
invention is one where the size of the patent rent corresponds to the qual-
ity of the signal for improvement coming from the technological informa-
tion actually disclosed by the patent application." 47 Presumably, they
mean the technological information actually disclosed in the patent as pub-
lished and made available to the public; however, at times they indicate the
344 Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865); see supra
text accompanying notes 170-78.
345 Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1875); Rubber Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 498 (1874); see supra text accompanying notes 191-96.
346 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 309, 319-20, 348.
347 Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
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invention signals348 and at others the patent signals.3 49 As the claims consti-
tute part of the patent specification, presumably they should also be capa-
ble of signaling.3 50 Whatever signals appear in the application would be
fixed at the filing date. 351 Grady and Alexander recognize the difficulty
that courts might have in appraising technological signals before the inven-
tion has been fully developed. Nonetheless, they would authorize the court
to rely upon hindsight at the time of litigation, so that the court could look
back from that time to determine whether the invention or patent had
actually signaled the accused subject matter.3 52 This is a rather peculiar
approach, because courts are constantly cautioning against the use of hind-
sight in patent law, particularly with respect to the obviousness issue, where
20/20 vision in hindsight is the bane of inventors.353
Grady and Alexander assert that courts have "developed some fairly
rigorous signaling principles. " 354 Supposedly, these principles are implied
in The Incandescent Lamp Patent case3 55 [hereinafter Lamp] and Columbia Mo-
tor Car Co. v. C.A. Duerr & Co.356 Grady and Alexander conclude that, in
these cases, the invention or patent did not signal the allegedly infringing
lamp or automobile at the time of filing, even though the claims were
broad enough to read literally upon the accused subject matter.357 The
claims thus did not seem to shed a very bright signal light. Would a differ-
ent result have been reached if the Sawyer and Man patent at issue in the
Lamp case had included a comprehensive listing of every conceivable fila-
ment material, including by chance the Japanese bamboo actually used by
348 Id. at 308-09, 318, 320.
349 Id. at 319.
350 "The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 2 (1988).
351 Applicants are prohibited from introducing new matter into their applications after the
filing date:
(a) No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of an application
after the filing date of the application (§ 1.53(b)). All amendments to the specification,
including the claims, and the drawings filed after the filing date of the application must
conform to at least one of them as it was at the time of the filing of the application.
Matter not found in either, involving a departure from or an addition to the original
disclosure, cannot be added to the application after its filing date even though sup-
ported by an oath or declaration in accordance with § 1.63 or § 1.67 filed after the filing
date of the application.
(b) If it is determined that an amendment filed after the filing date of the application
introduces new matter, claims containing new matter will be rejected and deletion of
the new matter in the specification and drawings will be required even if the amend-
ment is accompanied by an oath or declaration in accordance with § 1.63 or § 1.67.
Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.RL § 1.118 (1994).
352 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 320.
353 See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The trial
court, after the controversy had arisen, and with the '20-20 vision of hindsight', read the patent
entirely differently than did those concerned with its issue."); Fields v. Schuyler, 472 F.2d 1304,
1306 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Thejudge's experience enables him to compensate for the tendency of
inventions to look obvious-with the 20-20 vision of hindsight."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973);
Collins v. Kraft, 144 F. Supp. 162, 167 (D. Md. 1956) ("with the 20/20 vision of hindsight it may
now appear simple. .. ").
354 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 319.
355 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
356 184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911).
357 Grady & Alexander, supra note 7, at 319-20.
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Edison?358 A similar question could be posed concerning the Columbia Mo-
tor Car case: Would the result have differed if the Selden patent had specif-
ically listed every known automobile engine?3 59 After all, Selden's patent
specification stated: "Any form of liquid hydrocarbon engine of the com-
pression type may be employed in my improved locomotive."3 60 Would the.
result in Columbia Motor Car be different if Selden had added: "including,
in particular, the Brayton and Otto engines and any modifications and im-
provements thereof'? Selden, however lacking prescience, selected the
Brayton engine for improvement, while the Otto evolved into the industry
standard. Of course, whatever was included in the Selden application sig-
naled very little, for it was pending in the Patent Office for sixteen years,
during a period of many improvements in automobiles and engines.361
Because signaling is so important, this would suggest that patent appli-
cations should be encyclopedic in nature and should include every conceiv-
able potential improvement to support not only the patentability of the
invention but also its infringement at a later date. Patent attorneys, no
doubt, would embrace rent dissipation theory with alacrity, provided inven-
tors or their assignees would be willing to pay for such comprehensive ap-
plications. Such comprehensive applications might also assuage the
Supreme Court's concern that the disclosure of inventions in patents often
is inadequate.3 62 Rent dissipation certainly would be consistent with the
best mode requirement under § 112 and, moreover, would suggest that all
modes should be disclosed in order to minimize rent dissipation at the
358 In November 1879, Edison filed his patent application on a light bulb with a carbon fila-
ment in a spiral shape. This filament proved to be too brittle for commercial production. A
worldwide search was undertaken by Edison for the best filament material available in commer-
cial quantities. Japanese bamboo was finally selected. Initially, light bulbs usingJapanese bam-
boo filament would last for about 3 1/2 hours. By the end of 1880, they would burn for at least
240 hours. See FLATow, supra note 142, at 21; see also id. at 26 (using "The Light Bulb Hall of
Fame" to chart the municipal developments from 1802 to Edison's bulb in 1879).
359 Both the Brayton and Otto engines were prior art. The court stated in Columbia Motor Car
The phrase in the claim, "a liquid hydrocarbon engine of the compression type," is
descriptive of the Brayton engine, which came into use about 1873, and of the Otto
compression engine, which came into use a little later but still was in the antecedent art.
The Brayton was undoubtedly the leading compression engine at the time of this appli-
cation, but it was later superseded by the Otto.
Columbia Motor Car, 184 F. at 898.
360 Id. at 901.
361 As the court recognized:
It is apparent that [Selden] delayed just as long as possible the issue of the patent to
him. During this long time the automobile art made marked advances along different
lines, and when, in 1895, the patent was granted, it disclosed nothing new. Others had
then made the patentee's discovery and had reduced it to practice in ignorance of what
he had done. While he withheld his patent, the public learned from independent in-
ventors all that it could teach. For the monopoly granted by his patent he had nothing
to offer in return. The public gained absolutely nothingfrom his invention, whatever it
was. From the point of view of public interest it was even better that the patent had
never been granted.
Id. at 894-95.
362 See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) ("[Iun light of the highly developed
art of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful information as possible.., the
argument based on the virtue of disclosure must be warily evaluated.").
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improvement stage.363 Of course, courts may then find it necessary to dis-
tinguish "real" signals from "padded" ones.
V. CONCLUSION
The analogy between a unified theory in physics and a unified eco-
nomic theory of patents is admittedly a loose one. Nonetheless, while the
same degree of scientific verifiability cannot be expected of economic the-
ory, methodological rigor may not be ignored. It is not only science that
warns against overgeneralizations from limited data. Considerable doubt
may be cast on any theory that does the following: premises itself on a
limited number of non-randomly selected cases; 364 relies upon the subjec-
tive evaluation of inherently ambiguous terms;36 5 presumes all cases are
decided rightly;3 66 limits evaluation of the underlying patented invention
to the four-corners of the reported case opinion;367 runs counter to the
"Law of Parsimony;"3 68 and attempts to show superior predictive power by
comparing the theory to other theories designed for macro-level evaluation
of the patent system as a whole system rather than micro-level prediction of
the outcome of actual cases.
Within the constraints of the "uncertainty principle" (that statistical
probability of outcome is the best that can be expected), the outcome of
actual patent litigation may better be explained on the attitude (bias) of
the court toward patents at the time of decision. The change in the
Supreme Court's attitude from Deepsouth and Benson to Dawson Chemical
and Chakrabarty is enlightening. In Deepsouth and Benson, the Court took a
very narrow view of patents, some would say an antipatent view,3 69 while in
Dawson Chemical and Chakrabary the mood had shifted to a more expansive
view of what Congress had signaled.370 With the shifting of jurisdiction
over patent appeals from the respective circuits to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of
patents found valid and infringed.3 71 The pro-patent bias of the Court of
363 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring that the "specification shall... set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor for carrying out his invention").
364 Cf Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (study of over
1500 tort cases concluding the negligence standard produces an efficient allocation of re-
sources). See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW (1987).
365 For example, "signals," "elegant."
366 See Merges, Rent Contno supra note 126, at 367 ("Explaining cases that are no longer good
law comes perilously close to prescribing a normative theory... ."). Some cases, of course, were
never "good law."
367 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 282-303 (discussing the Graham '811 and '798
patents).
368 See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the contention by Grady and Alex-
ander that courts in patent cases reverse "Occan's Razor" ("Law of Parsimony")).
369 See, e.g., Chisum, Algorithms, supra note 190, at 961 (charging the Supreme Court with an
"antipatent judicial bias" with reference to the Benson case).
370 See A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis,
44 U. Prr. L. REv. 73, 80-81 (1982) (tracing the demise of the "clear and certain signal" test for
limiting patent protection).
371 From 1921 through 1978, courts of appeals invalidated 65% of the patents, while district
courts invalidated 55%. Lawrence Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the
Record, 56J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 758, 760-61 (1974). From 1948 through 1977, limited to the issue of
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit is palpable and may offer a far better indi-
cator of patent validity and infringement than any of the economic
theories.37 2
While economic theory, as presently understood and developed, may
not be capable of proving that the patent system provides a net benefit to
society or of predicting with any consistency the outcome of actual patent
cases, the study of such theories is believed to have considerable value if
this may lead to making the existing patent system more efficient. Eco-
nomic theory may provide a powerful analytical tool- for identifying patent
law rules and doctrines that produce inefficient results. Once these ineffi-
ciencies are identified, they may be addressed by statutory amendment and
in the litigation process. 37 3 Over time, society, at the margin, should
benefit.
nonobviousness, 52% of patents were held invalid by district courts and 64% by the courts of
appeals. Myron Cohen, Nonobviouses and the Circuit Courts of Appeal-Twenty-five Years in Review,
in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILrTY, supra note 282, at 3:1, 3:13.
During the first three years of operation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with
respect to appeals from district court, the invalidation rate decreased to 46% on the obviousness
issue and 50% on 35 U.S.C. § 102 issues. If 35 U.S.C. § 112 issues are included, the overall per-
centage of invalidity was 44%. Donald R. Dunner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Its
First Three Years: Introduction, 13 AIPLA QJ. 185, 186-89 (1985). In a later study, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit found validity in substantially all cases (only 3 out of 28 were
reversed), whereas trial courts were equally likely to reverse as to affirm invalidity. See Ronald B.
Coolley, What the Federal Circuit Has Done and How Often: Statistical Study of the CAFC Patent Deci-
sions-1982 to 1988, 71 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 385, 391 (1989). It is also interesting to note that the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a validity holding only 14 times out of 120
opportunities, thus indicating an affirmance rate of approximately 88%. See ROBERT L HARMON,
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUrr 639 (2d ed. 1991).
372 Cf. ChiefJudge Markey's speech to the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law
at the August 8, 1989 annual meeting of the American Bar Association in Honolulu, Hawaii,
where the patent bar was admonished to refute the "slur" that statistics, without reference to the
merit of individual cases, show the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to be biased in favor
of patents. The speech, titled "Courts are Clients Too" is reprinted in 8 PTC Newsletter, Sum-
mer/Fall 1989, at 3. These comments were evidently in response to published statistical analysis
of Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit validity and infringement decisions. See supra note
270. But see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
RFv. 1, 26-27 (1989) (identifying some patent law decisions favoring patentees).
373 See POSNER, supra note 14, at § 19.2 (indicating that inefficient rules are likely to be
litigated).
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